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THE NAKED COMMODITY OPTION CONTRACT
AS A SECURITY
JOSEPH C. LONG*
A new investment concept, the naked commodity futures option con-
tract, has swept the country over the past two years.' Although ostensi-
bly representing an option to buy or sell underlying commodity futures
contracts, the naked option contract is in substance nothing more than
A.B., J.D., University of. Missouri, Columbia; LL.M., University of Virginia. Asso-
ciate Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma.
Professor Long has served as Associate General Counsel and more recently as
Special Legal Consultant to the Oklahoma Securities Commission in its legal proceed-
ings involving commodity options. He also has appeared as an expert witness for the
State of Texas in that state's court of inquiry into commodity options. The Oklahoma
Securities Commission as a matter of policy disclaims responsibility for any private
publication by any of its members or staff. The views expressed are those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Oklahoma Securities Commission,
its administrator, or staff.-Ed.
1. A careful distinction should be drawn between the naked commodity option
contract and the even newer stock option contract presently being offered to the public
by a subsidiary of the Chicago Board of Trade. There is no question that the stock
option contract is a security. See SEC Rule 12a-6, 38 Fed. Reg. 11449 (1973); Proposed
SEC Rule 9b-1, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10397, CCH FED. SEC. L. RF.
79,517 (Sept. 21, 1973). The definition of a security in section 2(1) of the Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970), specifically provides that any right to purchase
a security is itself a security. Clearly, what the purchaser of a stock option receives
is the right, for a specific period of time, to purchase or sell the underlying stock at a
fixed price. Such an option, therefore, is a right to purchase a security and, by defini-
tion, itself a security. See 1 H. BLOOmENTHAL, SEcuRIIEs AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW,
§ 2.21 (1972); 1 L. Loss, SECuRTms REGULA ON 467-69 (2d ed. 1961). Whether the
commodity futures contracts underlying, or ostensibly underlying, commodity option
contracts are themselves securities remains, to an extent, unsettled. See notes 75-97
hzftra & accompanying text. For discussion of stock option contracts, see 1971 Op.
Anr'y GEN. (Ga.) 141; H. FILER, UNDERSTANDING PUT mm CALL OpTnoNs (1959); Gates,
The Developing Option Market: Regulatory Issues and New Investor Interest, 25
U. FLA. L. REV. 421 (1973).
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a bet between the investor and his dealer that the price of a given com-
modity future will rise or fall during a particular time period. The label
"naked" is applied because dealers in such options do not maintain
adequate inventories of the underlying futures and there generally is
no intent that they will ever change hands. The device, therefore, is
quite unlike conventional commodity option contracts, which normally
do involve the actual exchange of the underlying commodity futures
contracts upon exercise of an option.
As with many speculative investment schemes, the market in naked
commodity option contracts offers many hidden dangers for the unwary
investor. Unfortunately, protection has not been forthcoming, primarily
because the courts have been unable or unwilling to ascertain the im-
portant differences between conventional commodity options, which
at least arguably do not exhibit the characteristics of securities, and the
new naked option contracts, which clearly should be classified as se-
curities and regulated accordingly under state and federal law.
There not only is a manifest need to regulate the purchase and sale
of naked commodity options but also numerous theories under which
regulation may be accomplished within the framework of existing se-
curities legislation. The various arguments that the naked commodity
option falls within the definition of a security in state and federal legis-
lation require an understanding of the unique characteristics of this new
investment device. It is thus necessary initially to examine the mechanics
of the commodity option market, the historical background of com-
modity options, and the differences between naked options and the
conventional option contract.
THE NAKED COMMODITY OPTION TRANSACTION
Theoretically, the mechanics of commodity option transactions are
quite simple. The purchaser, for a fee, 2 receives from the option seller
2. This fee is known as the "premium" and is normally set by the option seller with-
out negotiation with the purchaser. In some cases it appears that dealers charge "all
the market will bear." See Higashi, A Report to the Honorable Frank J. Healy,
Corporation Commissioner, State of Oregon, On Commodity Put and Call Operations
1 (undated, issued Spring 1972). Other dealers indicate that the premium is at least in
part based upon the length of time the option is to be outstanding-the longer the
option, the higher the premium. It has been estimated that premiums constitute from
five to 15 percent of the current value of the underlying commodity futures contracts.
See First Federated Commodity Option Co., The Power of Commodity Options 2
(undated, issued Spring 1973). Harold Goldstein has indicated that 30 percent of the
premium price covers selling charges. BARRON'$, Mar. 5, 1973, at 5, col. 3.
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the contract right to buy from, or sell to, the grantor the underlying
commodity futures contracts at a fixed price (the "striking price" 3)
at any time during the life of the option. The option period is usually
fixed, ranging anywhere from one month to a year or 18 months.4 If the
purchaser buys an option to sell the underlying commodity futures to
the option seller, the option contract is known as a put. If, on the other
hand, the option is to buy futures contracts, then it is known as a call.
It is also possible for the purchaser to buy both a put and a call on
the same commodity at the same time; such a purchase is referred to
as a straddle, or, more commonly, simply as a double option.5
The purchaser of a call theoretically makes his profit when the market
for the underlying commodity futures rises. If this occurs, he exercises
his option, purchasing the commodity futures contracts from the seller
of the option at the striking price and reselling them in the open market;
his profit is the difference between the striking price and his selling
price, less the fee he paid for the option.' In the case of a put, the
option purchaser is betting that the market for commodity futures con-
tracts which he holds will fall. If his hopes are realized, he delivers the
contracts to the option seller and receives the striking price; his profit
derived from the option is the difference between the striking price
and the market price at the time he exercises the option, less the option
premium.
Historical Development
Commodity option contracts, in various forms, have been present in
the financial marketplace for a number of years. Before 1934, contracts
on domestic commodities, such as wheat and cotton, were traded ex-
3. The "striking price" is normally the market price of the underlying commodity
futures contract on the day that the option contract is sold. Higashi, supra note 2, at 2.
4. id.
5. In re Goldstein Samuelson, Inc., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 71,095 (Okla. Sec. Comm'n
Feb. 23, 1973). See also Cal. Corp. Comm'n Release No. 29-C, 1 BLuE SKY L. REP.
8679 (Feb. 8, 1973).
6. The mechanics of this procedure may be illustrated by the following example.
Assume that on September 1, Mr. Brown, expecting the price of silver to rise, paid
$1,200 for a one-year call option on a December New York Silver contract with a
striking price of $1.50 an ounce. If, during the year, the price of December New
York Silver rises to $1.80 an ounce, Mr. Brown can obtain a return of $0.30 an ounce
by buying at his contract striking price of $1.50 an ounce from the option dealer and
then selling at $1.80 an ounce on the open market. If the underlying contract calls for
10,000 ounces, Mr. Brown would recover his capital and realize an $1,800 net profit.
If, however, Mr. Brown had exercised his call option when the market price was only
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tensively on the major American exchanges. In that year, however, the
Commodity Exchange Authority banned trading in options on domestic
commodities because of the abuses which had developed in the com-
modity option market. 7 Trading in international or worldwide com-
modities, including silver, silver coins, platinum, cocoa, plywood, copper,
coffee, and world sugar, was not affected, since such items are not sub-
ject to the CEA's jurisdiction."
For many years commodity option contracts also have been traded
on the London market,9 although the London contracts have never
achieved popularity in this country. In addition, there are several metal
companies, such as the Mocatta Metals Corporation, which have issued
commodity options in the United States,'" but they too have not received
widespread investor acceptance.
A new breed of commodity options which has proved quite popular
in this country was the ingenious or misguided, depending upon one's
point of view, creation of Harold Goldstein, the founder of the largest
of the new naked commodity option firms. Beginning April 28, 1971,
Mr. Goldstein parlayed, in less than two years, an investment of only
$800 into Goldstein Samuelson, Inc.," a corporation with more than
100 outlets throughout the world selling over 175,000 options valued
at $88 million.' 2 As a result of the phenomenal success of this enterprise,
$1.60 an ounce and sold the underlying contract for the same price, he would have
suffered a net loss of $200. See Stipulation of All Relevant Facts in Lieu of Trial on
Preliminary and Permanent Injunction, SEC v. Goldstein Samuelson, Inc., Civ. A. No.
73-472 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Stipulation].
7. See The Wall Street Journal (SW ed.), Feb. 22, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
8. There have been suggestions that trading in options on these commodities be
brought under the regulatory control of the CEA. It has been reported that the
CEA will propose legislation to accomplish this purpose. Id. Feb. 7, 1973, at 7, col. 2;
id. June 29, 1973, at 32, col. 2.
9. The London market is comprised of a series of exchanges, including the London
Metal Exchange, a member of which issues options.
10. The Wall Street Journal (SW ed.), Feb. 22, 1973, at 1, col. 1; id. Mar. 6, 1973, at
14, col. 2.
11. The business was first organized as Goldstein, Samuelson and Associates, a sole
proprietorship which sold its first option for $250 on the day of its founding. Stipula-
tion, supra note 6, at 3, 5. The firm went through a series of incorporations and
mergers until it was adjudged bankrupt on April 30, 1973. Id. at 5. No additional capital
was contributed by Mr. Goldstein. The entire capital of the corporation consisted
of this $800, plus premium fees from the sale of commodity options and income
generated from the reinvestment of such fees. Id. at 19.
12. Id. at 7. Over a third of the gross sales, $31 million, were made in the last 18
trading days in February 1973, shortly before the company was placed in temporary
receivership. Id.
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other firms offering similar options were quickly formed.13 Although
the majority of these firms, including Goldstein Samuelson, have been
forced out of business, either because of bankruptcy or as a result of
increased regulatory pressure, a small group of second generation firms,
some operated by the promoters of the original companies, have begun to
appear in states which have not attempted to regulate trading in naked
options.14
The financial bonanza began to evaporate for Harold Goldstein and
the other naked commodity option dealers in October 1972, when the
Oklahoma Securities Commission gave Goldstein Samuelson notice of
its intent to issue a cease and desist order against the firm for violations
of the state securities law.15 Public hearings were held in November
1972, and an order was issued barring further sales of naked options in
late February 1973.16
During the same period, other state securities administrators began to
take cognizance of the abuses inherent in the sale of naked options and
to evaluate the need for protective regulation. In early February 1973,
Washington and Oregon securities authorities persuaded a number of
option dealers to refrain voluntarily from further sales in those states.17
Moreover, on February 8, 1973, the California commission, after holding
public hearings on the problem, issued an interpretative release stating
that it considered the "new" commodity option contracts to be securi-
13. Three of the larger firms were First Federated Commodity Trust Co, which
operated out of Baltimore, Commodity Options International, founded by Josef Rotter,
an early promoter in the area, and Puts and Calls, Inc., a California operation. For
a discussion of. the rise of these firms in the wake of Goldstein Samuelson, see
BaroN's, Jan. 8, 1973, at 5, col. 2.
14. For example, the American Board of Trade was offering commodity options
in the Wall Street Journal during the summer of 1973, and Preferred Commodity Op-
tions Corp., an Oklahoma firm, was licensed by the Oklahoma Securities Commission
as a broker-dealer in commodity options on July 24, 1973. For a summary of the
activities of these new second generation option dealers, see The Wall Street Journal
(SW ed.), June 28, 1973, at 32, col. 2.
15. Notice of Intention to Issue Cease and Desist Order, Okla. Sec. Comm'n
(Oct. 26, 1972).
16. In re Goldstein Samuelson, Inc., 3 BLuE SKY L. REP. 71,095 (Okla. Sec. Comm'n
Feb. 23, 1973). This order was followed by a series of summary orders against other
commodity option firms operating in Oklahoma. See, e.g., In re P & W Inv. Co.,
Summary Cease and Desist Order, Okla. Sec. Comm'n (Feb. 26, 1973); In re Puts and
Calls of Okla., Inc., Summary Cease and Desist Order, Okla. Sec. Comm'n (Feb. 23,
1973).
17. The Oregon Journal, Feb. 6, 1973, § 4, at 7, col. 1. The Oregon Corporation Com-
mission bad filed suit in state court against Goldstein Samuelson in November 1972. id.
The case has not come to trial.
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ties.18 Three weeks later, the California Corporation Commissioner, upon
receiving information that Harold Goldstein was attempting to transfer
Goldstein Samuelson funds to a private account in Canada,19 issued a
cease and refrain order against the firm barring further sales of naked
options.20 Simultaneously, the Securities and Exchange Commission re-
instituted a suit to have a temporary receiver appointed to hold the assets
of Goldstein Samuelson and its one-time parent corporation.2 '
Other firms specializing in the sale of naked commodity option con-
tracts have met a similar fate. The Maryland Securities Commission,
18. Cal. Corp. Comm'n Release No. 29-C, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 8679 (Feb. 8, 1973).
See also Press Release of Brian R. Van Camp, Cal. Corp. Comm'r (Feb. 22, 1973).
19. See Declaration of Arthur H. Maslansky, filed in People v. Goldstein Samuelson,
Inc., Civ. A. No. C 50847 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. County, filed Feb. 27, 1973). See also
BARRON'S, Mar. 5, 1973, at 5, col. 1.
20. In re Goldstein Samuelson, Inc., Cease and Refrain Order, Cal. Corp. Comm'n
(Feb. 27, 1973). Similar cease and refrain orders were issued the day before against
World-Wide Commodity Options, Inc. and Puts and Calls, Inc. In each of these cases,
the California Corporation Commission also filed suit requesting the appointment of a
receiver and a temporary restraining order. In the World-Wide suit, the temporary
injunction and appointment of a receiver were refused. People v. World-Wide Com-
modity Options, Civ. A. Nos. 51070, 51130 (Cal. Super. Ct, L.A. County, Mar. 6, 1973).
In the case against Puts and Calls, Inc., the temporary injunction and receivership
were denied, but the court later granted a permanent injunction. People v. Puts and
Calls, Inc., 3 BLUE SKY L. RaP. 71,090 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. County, June 21, 1973).
The Commission also instituted proceedings against New Life Management, Inc.,
International Commodity Options Underwriters, and Option/Economics Corp. CALI.
CORP. SEc. NEWSLTTER No. 11, at 4 (Apr. 1973). The New Life order subsequently
was challenged in an administrative hearing, and a hearing officer's finding that the
naked options were securities was affirmed by the Commission. In re New Life
Management, Inc., File No. Alpha L-4072, Cal. Corp. Comm'n Ad. Hearing (June 8,
1973).
21. SEC v. First Leisure Corp., Civ. A. No. 72-2616 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 1973). On
March 11, 1973, however, the district court refused to continue the temporary re-
ceivership. This decision was appealed immediately to the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, but before the appeal could be heard, Goldstein Samuelson was forced
into involuntary bankruptcy and the temporary receiver discharged. The case is
presently before the bankruptcy court. Letter from Gerald E. Boltz, Regional Adm'r,
SEC, to the author, Oct. 17, 1973. In the meantime, the SEC filed another suit seeking
a civil injunction and the appointment of a receiver. SEC v. Goldstein Samuelson, Inc.,
Civ. No. 73-472 (C.D. Cal., filed Mar. 5, 1973), sunmmarized in [1972-73 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fm. SEe. L. REP. 93,800. This suit is still pending, but recently the
parties entered into a stipulated agreement of facts. Stipulation, supra note 6. It appears
that the case may be settled by consent decree. Letter from Gerald E. Boltz, supra.
The SEC also filed a suit against Commodity Options International, Inc., which
was settled by consent decree. The Wall Street Journal (SW ed.), Apr. 9, 1973,
at 15, col. 4.
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for example, obtained a court order enjoining further sale of option con-
tracts by First Federated Commodity Trust Company on the ground
that such sales violated the Maryland Securities Act.22
These actions proved to be a harbinger of rulings by a number of
other state securities commissions that the "new" options are securities
and subject to regulation under state blue sky laws.23  The courts,
however, have been more cautious in dealing with the question. In the
only federal court decision other than that involving Goldstein Samuel-
son in which the issue has been decided, it was held that the SEC had
not established that the options are securities;24 the court refused to en-
join sales of option contracts by the Continental Commodities Corpora-
tion. Decisions in the state courts are conflicting. In International Com-
modity Trust, Inc. v. Fisher,25 an Oklahoma court held that the options
are not covered by the state's securities law. Classification of naked
options as securities has been upheld, however, in the Maryland case,
22. Shapiro v. First Federated Commodity Trust Co., 3 BLu SKY L. REP. 71,058
(Md. Cir. Ct., Baltimore County, Feb. 27, 1973), injunction 7nade pernanent, 3 BLuE
SKY L. REP. 71,071 (Md. Cir. Ct, Baltimore County, May 30, 1973).
23. In re Commodity Options, 1 BLUE SKY L. RE. 9722 (Colo. Sec. Comm'n May
22, 1973); In re Commodity Options, General Cease and Desist Order, 2 BLUE SKY
L. REP. 41,358 (Pa. Sec. Comm'n May 29, 1973); In re Commodity Options, Notice
and Order, 3 BLUE SKY L. RaP. 47,656 (Utah Sec. Comm'n Mar. 2, 1973) (see also
Letter of Explanation of Order, Utah Sec. Comm'n, Mar. 16, 1973); Letter from William
W. Ladwig, Sec. Exmr., State of Alaska, to William G. Fisher, Adm'r, Okla. Sec.
Comm'n, May 30, 1973; Statement of the Georgia Securities Commissioner concerning
Commodities Trading and the Georgia Securities Law, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 14,612
(Sept. 18, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Commodities Trading); INDiANA SEc. Div.
MONTHLY Buar.. 3 (July 1973); MicH. SEc. BurLo. 1 (Mar. 1973); Letter from James Kirk-
patrick, Secretary of. State of Missouri, to Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 2 BLUE SKY
L. REP. 28,651 (1973); Statement of Pat McKeever, Commissioner of Securities, State
of South Dakota, BLUE SKY L. Rt. No. 477, at 3 (Sept. 26, 1973).
24. SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., Civ. No. CA 3-6976-D (N.D. Tex. Apr.
9, 1973). Issues raised in a pending appeal include several besides whether com-
modity options are securities. Letter from Gerald E. Boltz, Regional Adm'r, SEC, to
the author, Oct. 17, 1973. In another case, In re Traders Int'l, Ltd., Bankruptcy No.
7350 (D. Nev. Aug. 23, 1973), the referee in bankruptcy held that commodity options
are securities. This determination is being reviewed by the district court.
25. 3 BLUE SKY L. Rat'. 71,075 (Okla. Dist. Ct., Okla. County, May 14, 1973)
(permanent injunction against the administrator preventing further enforcement of the
securities laws against the plaintiff). This decision was not appealed because on the
day following its announcement the Governor of Oklahoma signed emergency legis-
lation specifically including commodity option contracts within that state's definition
of a security. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 2(20) (0) (1971), as amended by Okla. Laws
1973, H.B. 1035, § I (May 15, 1973).
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Shapiro v. First Federated Commodity Trust Co.,26 and, more recently,
by a California court in People v. Puts and Calls, Inc. 27
It is significant to note that the only decisions dealing with naked op-
tions have been at the trial level. In addition, appeal of most of the
present cases is unlikely, since the offending companies are bankrupt 2
and no longer selling option contracts. Nevertheless, since new com-
panies are being formed, it is essential that the courts comprehend the
abuses inherent in the naked commodity option transaction and develop
theories to protect the investing public.29
Conventional Options vs. The New "Naked" Options
The key to understanding the argument that the "new" option con-
tract should be deemed a security and thus subject to regulation under
the federal and state securities laws while the traditional commodity
26. 3 BLuE SKY L. REP. 71,071 (Md. Cir. Ct., Baltimore County, May 30, 1973).
27. 3 BLuE SKY L. REP. 71,090 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. County, June 21, 1973). The
status of naked options also has been raised in a series of recent Texas cases. In State
v. King Commodity Co., Civ. A. No. 73-7339G (Tex. Dist. Ct., Dallas County, Oct.
18, 1973), the court held commodity options to be securities and granted a temporary
injunction against their further sale. This order has been appealed to the Court of
Civil Appeals. Appeal No. 18291, 5th Sup. Jud. Dist., filed Nov. 14, 1973. Temporary
restraining orders have been secured in two other cases. State v. Stocks Int'l Com-
modities, Inc., Civ. A. No. 73-3423-J (Tex. Dist. Ct., Dallas County, Nov. 6, 1973);
State v. Southwest Bd. of Trade, Inc, Civ. A. No. 73-7741D (Tex. Dist. Ct., Dallas
County, Oct. 11, 1973). However, in Great S. Brokerage, Inc. v. Mouer, Civ. A. No.
211,259 (Tex. Dist. Ct., Travis County, Nov. 1, 1973), the plaintiff obtained a declara-
tory judgment that naked commodity options are not securities. This case will be
appealed. Letter from Richard D. Latham, Director of Enforcement, Texas State Sec.
Bd., to the author, Nov. 15, 1973.
28. See, e.g, In re Puts and Calls, Inc, Civ. A. No. 73-02706 (C.D. Cal., filed May 3,
1973); In re King Commodity, Inc., Bankruptcy No. 73-H-446 (S.D. Tex., filed Oct.
1, 1973). It has been estimated that Goldstein Samuelson left unsatisfied option holder
claims of between $14 and $85 million. The exact amount is unknown because the
temporary receiver has been unable to put in order the financial records of the com-
pany. Already, many suits have been filed in an attempt to shift the loss from the op-
tion dealers to the issuing firms. See, e.g., Eckman v. Jackson, Civ. No. 93-73 (D.
Utah, filed Mar. 19, 1973); Midgley v. Traders Int'l, Ltd., Civ. No. C69-73 (D. Utah,
filed Mar. 4, 1973). These bankruptcy actions will have to decide whether the options
are securities, since the holder of a security issued without required registration, upon
rescinding an alleged purchase, obtains a status equal or superior to other general
creditors. See Slain & Kripke, The Interface Between Securities Regulation and Bank-
ruptcy-Allocating the Risk of Illegal Securities Issuance Between Securityholders and
the Issuer's Creditors, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 261 (1973).
29. The abuses which have occurred in the naked option market are not surprising
when one considers the statement by Josef Rotter, one of the leading option dealers, that
50 to 60 percent of individuals in the industry could not meet the registration re-
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option perhaps should not be so classified is an appreciation of the
differences in substance between the two types of transaction. The
primary purpose of the London or Mocatta option, issued against an
existing stock of the commodity owned by the optionor,30 is to serve
as a hedge for the optionor against a price increase or decrease in the
commodity, which often constitutes an integral part of his business."'
These options are sold in relatively small numbers to a small group
of highly sophisticated investors thoroughly familiar with the commodity
market and the purpose and workings of the commodity option. Such
investors do not have to rely upon the expertise of the option seller for
advice on which options to buy. Moreover, since there is a market for
these options, which, like the underlying commodity futures, are freely
tradable from one investor to another, the option holder has several
ways in which he may realize a profit. He may, for example, sell his
option to another investor during the course of the option period. Al-
ternatively, he may exercise his option, taking delivery of the underlying
commodities or futures contracts, in the case of a call, or selling the
commodities or futures to the option issuer, where a put is involved.
The result in each case is an actual movement in the underlying goods.
Sellers of the "new" option contracts have adopted the technical
legal form of the older option, but nothing else. First, the "new" options
quirements for dealers and registered representatives under the various securities acts
because of past felony convictions or securities law violations. The Wall Street Journal
(SW ed.), Feb. 22, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
30. BARON'S, Mar. 5, 1973, at 5, col. 3. It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss
in detail the mechanics of the London or Mocatta-type option. It is the author's under-
standing that the principal difference between naked options and London options is
that the latter normally are fully covered by existing stocks of the commodity held by
the person issuing the option. As a result, the person who invests in London options does
not have to bear the additional "enterprise risk" that the issuer of the option will be
unable to perform. Commodities Trading, supra note 23. Recently, however, London
options have been the subject of investigation by the Texas Securities Board. The Tran-
script of Hearings before the Texas Securities Commissioner in In re Clayton Brokerage
(Nov. 2-3, 6-7, 1973) describes in detail the workings of the London options. From this
testimony, it appears that not all such options are sold against existing commodity stocks
or futures contracts. In such case, there would be little difference between them and
the naked options discussed in this Article. The Texas Commissioner recently held that
the London options as sold by Clayton Brokerage did involve the sale of securities. In re
Clayton Brokerage, Order No. 24-513 (Tex. Sec. Bd., Dec. 18, 1973), sunrnarized in SEC.
REG. & L. REP. No. 235, at A-16 (Jan. 16, 1974). An appeal from this holding was filed
immediately. A similar conclusion was reached in a consent decree entered in In re
Traders Int'l, Ltd., Bankruptcy No. 7350 (D. Nev. Aug. 23, 1973) (opinion of referee).
31. Cf. Texas Arizona Mining Co., [1971-72 transfer binder] CCII FED. SEc. L.
REP. t 78,626 (no action letter, Jan. 19, 1972).
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are not sold against an existing inventory of underlying commodities.
In the trade they are called "naked options" because they represent
nothing more than the seller's unsupported promise to perform. Since
an inventory of commodities or futures is not required, any person can
enter the business merely by opening an office and selling naked op-
tions. 2 The leading option dealers, although maintaining that it would
be economically impossible to maintain a complete inventory to back
the options, claim that they limit their potential liability on outstanding
options by purchasing a certain percentage of underlying futures con-
tracts.33 The formula for determining this percentage, however, remains
a secret.
The potential for abuse inherent in such an unregulated system is
manifest. The ramifications are very similar to those which would
result if, without provision for controlling cash reserves and investments,
banks were permitted to accept deposits in exchange for their promises to
honor demands.34 Since the formula for purchasing is itself secret
(rumor has it that it was claimed to be 35 to 40 percent) and unregu-
lated, there is no way to determine whether dealers are maintaining
adequate percentages of underlying futures contracts to protect in-
32. This conclusion is well supported by the fact that Harold Goldstein began
Goldstein Samuelson with a capital investment of only $800 on April 28, 1971, and
on the same day sold his first option for $250. Stipulation, supra note 6, at 5.
33. Testimony of Harold Goldstein, Transcript of Hearings before the Okla. Sec.
Adm'r, In re Goldstein Samuelson, Inc., 91-92 (Nov. 21, 1972) [hereinafter cited as
Testimony]. Of course, the maintenance of such an inventory is physically impossible
when the dealer sells puts, because such options represent the right of the optionee
to sell the underlying futures contract to the optioner. The only method of hedging
available to the optioner in such a case is to go into the market and sell futures con-
tracts short. If, however, the option is not exercised, the optioner will still have to
meet his obligation to supply the futures contracts.
34. Realizing that the potential for abuse would bother investors, Harold Goldstein
forged a letter stating that American Bankers Insurance Company of Miami had
written a $1 million performance bond to ensure the payment of the Goldstein
Samuelson options. This forged letter was shown to many of Goldstein Samuelson's
representatives and potential customers. Stipulation, supra note 6, at 15. In subsequent
prosecutions for these activities, Mr. Goldstein pleaded guilty to three counts of mail
fraud and was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment. The Wall Street Journal (SW ed.),
Nov. 12, 1973, at 11, col. 1.
Goldstein Samuelson is not the only firm in the naked commodities industry which
has engaged in fraudulent practices. For example, the King Commodity Co. set up
Investor Guaranty Corp., which, as its name suggests, was to "guarantee" that King
would meet its naked option obligations. Investigation, however, has revealed that the
two corporations were not separate entities, but the same corporation doing business
under two names. See State's Brief, State v. King Commodity Co., Civ. A. No. 73-7339G
(Tex. Dist. Ct., Dallas County, Oct. 18, 1973).
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vestors3 5 Indeed, as a result of the collapse of several of the leading
option dealers, evidence has come to light which indicates that the
claim of hedging was only a cruel hoax and that no hedging was ever in
fact done.3 6
Furthermore, the practice of hedging would be counterproductive
for a dealer with calls outstanding, since it would tend to force upward
the price of the underlying commodity futures; the result would be a
guaranteed profit to holders of the calls. The natural tendency of op-
tion dealers thus would appear to be to use their market activities to mini-
mize the market movement of underlying futures. In short, in order to
reduce their potential liability on calls, they will sell, rather than buy
for hedging purposes, futures contracts in an attempt to stabilize the
market price at, or as near as possible, the striking price of the options.
A major reason for the ultimate collapse of Goldstein Samuelson was
such an attempt to manipulate the futures market in an effort to reduce
the firm's losses on option contracts. In the fall of 1972, it had out-
standing a substantial number of calls on world coffee. That year the
price of world coffee futures rose significantly. The appropriate course
of action under the hedging policy the firm now claims it followed
would have been to enter the market and buy futures to back its out-
35. According to Mr. Goldstein, this is no problem, since, in his view, the purpose
of hedging is to protect the dealer and not the investor. He maintains that the in-
vestor has no interest in or claim to the premium fee once it is paid to the option
dealer, who, according to Mr. Goldstein, is free to use it in any manner he wishes,
including investment in the futures market, stocks, or real estate, or for payment of his
overhead costs. Testimony, supra note 33, at 59.
36. In the case of Goldstein Samuelson, it appears that the firm did engage in
hedging operations from April to September 1971, at which time the practice was dis-
continued in order to generate additional operating capital. In February 1972, as the
result of inquiries from the public and various regulatory agencies concerning its
hedging practices, Goldstein Samuelson again opened trading accounts. These ac-
counts, however, were used for speculation, not hedging. Stipulation, supra note 6,
at 13, 15. It appears that First Federated Commodity Trust Co. never bought or sold
commodity futures contracts. Shapiro v. First Federated Commodity Trust Co, 3
BLtTE SKY L. REP. 71,071 (Md. Cir. Ct, Baltimore County, May 30, 1973); id. (opinion
on Lombard Street Account, May 30, 1973) (unreported). Claims of successful option
holders were satisfied in one 'of two ways. The dealers either persuaded them to
leverage their profits by reinvesting in additional options or paid them off with money
generated from the sale of options to others. Because of constantly increasing sales,
most dealers were able to continue this practice, even when bankruptcy appeared im-
minent. During the calendar year 1972, for example, Goldstein Samuelson sold $45
million worth of options. The firm's business continued to expand, and in a period
of only 18 days in February 1973, it sold $31 million in options. The firm was ad-
judged bankrupt on April 30, 1973. Stipulation, supra note 6, at 5, 7.
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standing options. This would, of course, have had the effect of driving
the price even higher. Instead, it appears that Goldstein Samuelson
sold futures in a deliberate effort to depress the market. This attempt,
however, proved unsuccessful, and Goldstein Samuelson apparently lost
a vast sum of money as a result.31 Although the loss was significant in
that it was detrimental to the financial solvency of the company, and
ultimately injurious to its customers, much more importantly it demon-
strates the serious conflict often present between the interests of the
option dealer and his customers. Such a conflict may not be important
where the parties deal at arm's length, as in the London or Mocatta
option markets. It is, however, extremely significant in the naked option
market, where, as will be seen, the option dealer clearly operates from
a fiduciary, rather than an arm's length, position.
The second major difference between the London or Mocatta option
and the new "naked" option involves the type of investor to whom
they are sold. As was previously noted, purchases of conventional com-
modity options generally are by a small group of highly sophisticated
large investors thoroughly familiar with the mechanics of the commodity
option market. In contrast, dealers in naked option contracts have
taken pride in testifying that they seek out small investors, that is, those
with from $1,000 to $2,000 to invest. In fact, Mr. Goldstein has indi-
cated that most of his customers had been refused trading accounts with
other brokerage houses because of the small nature of their transactions.3
The thrust of statements made in sales literature issued by the new
option dealers tends to confirm Mr. Goldstein's assertions.3 9 This litera-
ture is not directed toward the large, knowledgeable professional in-
vestor but rather at the ribbon clerk or other amateur investor willing
to speculate with his life's savings. The very tone of the literature indi-
cates that it is not intended for someone familiar with the commodity
market or the workings of commodity options. Instead, it attempts
to give the reader an oversimplified view of commodity investing, with
an emphasis on the spectacular profits which allegedly can be made with
37. It is estimated that the loss from market transactions was over $1 million. The
Wall Street Journal (SW ed.), Feb. 26, 1973, at 9, col. 2. Moreover, option holders
who sold during this period netted between $2 million and $3 million. The entire trans-
action, therefore, may have cost Goldstein Samuelson as much. as $4 million.
38. Testimony, supra note 33, at 89. See also In re Goldstein Samuelson, Inc., 3 BLUE
SKY L. REP. 71,095 (Okla. Sec. Comm'n Feb. 23, 1973).
39. Goldstein Samuelson, Inc., An Investment Opportunity (undated, issued 1972);
First Federated Commodity Option Co., The Power of Commodity Options (undated,
issued Spring 1973); P & W Investment Co., An Unexploited Financial Opportunity
(undated, issued early 1973).
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a minimal capital expenditure and without the risk of further investment
demands by way of margin calls. No attempt is made to point out that
the vast majority of investors in the commodity futures market lose
money.40 A reasonable conclusion is that it is greed, and not an under-
standing of the commodities market, which causes an investor to specu-
late in naked option contracts. 41 It is this type of investor whom pro-
visions in the various securities laws proscribing fraud and requiring
disclosure in the sale of securities were enacted to protect.
Because the small investor generally is uninformed about develop-
ments in the financial communities, he is extremely dependent upon the
option dealer and his salesmen for advice as to which options to purchase.
Mr. Goldstein reluctantly admitted that Goldstein Samuelson and its
salesmen provided "tips" to customers on the options most likely to
generate a profit.42 By engaging in such a practice, the dealer is faced
with an extremely serious conflict of interest; since there is no ready
market for naked options, the issuing firm must be prepared to take up
all profitable options and itself sustain a loss. 43 The conflict ultimately
must lead either to investment advice which is less than fair or to the
sustaining of large losses by the dealer; the potential harm to the in-
vestor in either case is evident. In any event, relegation of the purchaser
to a passive role in the investment process is a highly significant factor
in determining whether the naked option is a security under state and
federal securities laws.4 4 In this regard, it has been established that at
40. The Wall Street Journal quotes several commodity experts as indicating that
small speculators in commodities futures suffer losses in 90 percent of their transac-
tions. The Wall Street Journal (SW ed.), Feb. 22, 1973, at 1, col. 1. The SEC and
Harold Goldstein agree that the figure is 75 percent or higher. Stipulation, supra note
,6, at 21. Goldstein Samuelson, however, claimed that 70 percent of its option purchas-
ers were winners. Id. This figure is not supported by the record, which reveals that
before bankruptcy, Goldstein Samuelson wrote 175,000 options, only 85,000 of which
were subsequently repurchased for about $19 million. Id. at 7.
41. See In re Goldstein Samuelson, Inc., 3 BLuE SKY L. REP. 71,095 (Okla. Sec.
Comm'n Feb. 23, 1973).
42. Testimony, supra note 33, at 57-59, 89-91. See also Testimony of Joe L. Samuel,
Transcript of Proceedings before the Okia. Sec. Adm'r, In re Goldstein Samuelson,
Inc, 53-54; Findings of Fact, In re Goldstein Samuelson, Inc., 3 BLuE SKY L. REP.
,q 71,095 (Okla. Sec. Comm'n Feb. 23, 1973).
43. Testimony, supra note 33, at 88.
44. See Findings of Fact, In re Goldstein Samuelson, Inc., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP.
71,095 (Okla. Sec. Comm'n Feb. 23, 1973). This factor is at the heart of the distinc-
tion the federal courts have drawn between commodity futures contracts and dis-
cretionary accounts which trade in such futures, holding only the latter to be securi-
ties. Compare McCurnin v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 340 F. Supp. 1338 (ED. La. 1972) and
Schwartz v. Bache & Co., 340 F. Supp. 995 (SD. Iowa 1972) with Commercial Iron
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least some of the option firms have a standing policy of automatically
exercising any outstanding option in which the customer has a profit
on the last day of the option period, even if it has not received instruc-
tions from the customer to do so. 41
At least one court, in holding that a naked option is not a security,
naively assumed that trading in such options is a matter where a knowl-
edgeable investor, utilizing his own insight and business experience,
selects his investment, purchases it from the dealer, and holds it until,
in his judgment, it is time to sell in order to make a profit.46 If, however,
& Metal Co. v. Bache & Co, 478 F.2d 39 (10th Cir. 1973) and Berman v. Orimex
Trading, Inc, 291 F. Supp. 701 (SD.N.Y. 1968). But see Milnarik v. M-S Commodities,
Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972). That the
purchaser depended on a third party to select the investment was one of the major
reasons given by recent decisions holding that the sale of scotch whiskey warehouse
receipts involved the sale of securities. SEC v. Haffenden-Rimar Int'l, Inc., 362 F.
Supp. 323 (ED. Va. 1973); SEC v. M.A. Lundy Assoc., 362 F. Supp. 226 (D.R.I. 1973);
Pa. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 49, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP'. T 71,094 (July 17, 1973). See also
SEC v. Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc., CCH FED. Sac. L. REP. t 94,142 (S.D.N.Y.,
filed Aug. 23, 1973).
It is interesting to note that Goldstein Samuelson originally offered discretionary
accounts in commodity options guaranteeing the customer a 10 percent return on
his investment. The SEC claimed that these discretionary accounts were securities,
and Goldstein Samuelson entered into a consent decree in which it agreed to discon-
tinue this service. SEC v. First Leisure Corp., Civ. A. No. 72-2616 (C.D. Cal. Nov.
3, 1972). In Commercial Iron & Metal Co. v. Bache & Co., supra, and Berman v.
Orimex Trading, Inc., supra, it was held that even though a brokerage contract does
not expressly create a discretionary account, if the actual selection of options in fact
is left to the option dealer, a discretionary arrangement can be implied.
45. Testimony, supra note 33, at 24. See also Findings of Fact, In re Goldstein
Samuelson, Inc., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 71,095 (Okla. Sec. Comm'n Feb. 23, 1973); First
Federated Commodity Option Co., The Power of Commodity Options 3 (undated,
issued Spring 1973); King Commodity Co., Commodity Options, What Can They Do
for You? 3 (undated, issued Spring 1973). Such a procedure clearly is contrary to
the normal practice in the sale of options. See, e.g., London Metal Exchange, Rules and
Regulations, Rule J (1968). It certainly is not in the economic interests of the option
dealer to pick up a profitable option which the option holder intentionally or negli-
gently has allowed to lapse. Again, however, the practice reflects the realization by the
dealers that the unskilled investor is often completely dependent upon them. If the
investor is so lacking in knowledge concerning his investment that he does not know
when the option lapses or that it has an expiration date, he will be very unhappy with
the dealer when he learns that he has lost a profit because of his own inaction. Some
dealers have limited their costs under the automatic repurchase feature by reinvesting
the investor's "profits" in a new option, also automatically. King Commodity Co.,
Commodity Options, What Can They Do for You? 2 (undated, issued Spring 1973);
Testimony of Mr. Kimmons, Transcript of Trial, at 40-41, State v. King Commodity
Co., Civ. A. No. 73-7339G (Tex. Dist. Ct., Dallas County, Oct. 18, 1973), appeal pending.
46. International Commodity Trust, Inc. v. Fisher, 3 BLuE SKY L. REP. 71,075
(Okla. Dist. Ct., Okla. County, May 14, 1973).
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the substance of the transaction is examined, as courts constantly are ad-
monished to do in securities cases, 4 7 it becomes evident that naked
options are being sold to individuals with no information or investment
experience on which to base their option selection and who, therefore,
are tied to the tips or suggestions of the option dealer or his salesmen.
Furthermore, because such an investor is incapable of making an intelli-
gent decision as to when to exercise his option, the decision is auto-
matically made for him by his dealer. Thus, without ever possessing
any knowledge of the investment medium or exercising any discretion,48
the investor can purchase an option contract relying solely upon the
expertise of the option dealer or his representative, retain the option for
its life, and, if it is profitable, receive a return at the end of the option
period through operation of a standing automatic repurchase policy.
Under this arrangement, the holder of a naked option is nothing more
than a passive investor expecting his return solely through the efforts
of others.49
The automatic repurchase policies emphasize the final significant
difference between conventional and naked options. Rarely are naked
options settled by the actual exchange of the underlying futures con-
tracts. Instead, the option dealer merely "repurchases" the option from
the holder, paying him the difference between the striking price of the
option and the current market value of the underlying futures con-
tracts. 0 Harold Goldstein recently testified that customers of Gold-
stein Samuelson had never demanded acceptance by the firm of
underlying futures contracts when put options were exercised and that
delivery of underlying futures had been demanded in less than one-half
of one percent of the cases in which call options were exercised.51 Other
option dealers have given up any pretense of satisfying naked options
47. See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,
328 U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
48. In re Goldstein Samuelson, Inc., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 71,095 (Okla. Sec. Comm'n
Feb. 23, 1973).
49. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
50. In re Goldstein Samuelson, Inc., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 71,095 (Okla. Sec. Comm'n
Feb. 23, 1973).
51. Testimony, supra note 33, at 77. See also Testimony of Joe L. Samuel, Transcript
of Proceedings before the Okla. Sec. Adm'r, In re Goldstein Samuelson, Inc., 21, 24
(Nov. 22, 1972). This is confirmed by the stipulation between Goldstein Samuelson and
the SEC indicating that although the firm sold over 175,000 options during its life,
on only four occasions did it attempt to deliver the commodities and in only one case
did it buy the commodity futures contracts from the customer. Stipulation, supra note
6, at 11.
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by actual exchange of the underlying futures contracts, indicating in
their sales literature that settlement will be made by "repurchase." 52
The emphasis on repurchase as the means for settlement of naked
commodity option transactions is significant for a number of reasons.
First, it raises the question whether these options have any economic
justification. As previously noted,53 the London or Mocatta option does
serve a valid economic purpose by permitting the actual user of the
commodity to hedge against a fluctuation in the price of the commodity
and thereby shift his risk of loss to others. 4 On the other hand, because
naked option contracts generally are not settled by the actual exchange
of underlying futures contracts and thus do not serve any hedging
function, they are nothing more than a vehicle for speculative invest-
ment.
Indeed, if holders of naked option contracts realistically had the
right to demand delivery of the underlying futures contracts, there
are strong indications that trading in such options could have a very
detrimental effect on an orderly market. Only a small number of fu-
tures contracts on the unregulated "international" commodities are
outstanding at any given time, and an even smaller number actually
appear in the trading market. Since, however, there is no limit on the
number of naked options which can be issued on a particular commodity,
it is likely that in an active market outstanding naked options will great-
ly outnumber outstanding futures contracts. 51 Market chaos would
52. First Federated Commodity Option Co., The Power of Commodity Options 2-3
(undated, issued Spring 1973).
53. See notes 30-31 supra & accompanying text.
54. Futures contracts on commodities also permit the user to hedge against price
fluctuation. Trading in options on the futures contracts, however, results in an addi-
tional level of hedging and speculation; if. the number of options becomes too great,
the underlying futures market may be adversely affected. Indeed, widespread trading
in options apparently was one of the causes leading to the price collapse of the Chicago
Board of Trade in 1932. It has been estimated that options accounted for about
15 percent of the total trading volume on the exchange. See The Wall Street Journal
(SV ed.), Feb. 23, 1973, at 1, col. 1. In recognition of the problems and abuses
inherent in option trading, the Commodity Exchange Authority in 1934 proscribed
such trading with respect to all commodities subject to its jurisdiction. See note 7 supra
& accompanying text.
55. In an informal conversation with Michael Alpert, Chief Deputy California Corpo-
ration Commissioner, the author was told that a California investigation disclosed that
such a situation actually had occurred on several occasions in late 1972 and early
1973 when the volume of naked option sales reached new highs. This fact is con-
firmed in the stipulation between Goldstein Samuelson and the SEC. Stipulation, supra
note 6, at 26.
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result in such a situation if option holders, attempting to realize a
profit in a rising futures market, demanded actual delivery of the futures
contracts. Attempts by option dealers to outbid each other for the
limited number of outstanding futures contracts would artificially in-
flate the price of such contracts and could force legitimate buyers out
of the market.
Because it generally is not necessary that there be an actual delivery
of underlying futures contracts in order to settle naked options, many
informed observers have concluded that such options represent nothing
more than a sophisticated form of gambling.56 Recently, three state
securities administrators have commented unofficially51 that the naked
option transaction is just a variation of the classic "bucket shop" opera-
tion,5 8 a practice which for years has been illegal in most states.5 9
56. See The Wall Street Journal (SW ed.), June 28, 1973, at 32, col. 1 (comments of
Alex Caldwell, Adm'r, CEA). Many individuals in the option business do not deny
this. Lew Watts of the New York Mercantile Exchange, for example, has said: "Sure,
it's like playing the numbers. But everyone does it. You should hear how everybody
yells and screams around the exchange when the cops pinch our members' runner."
Id. Feb. 23, 1973, at 1, col. 1. Even Harold Goldstein has admitted that an investment
in a naked option is a gamble. FoaBEs, Aug. 15, 1973, at 66.
57. The California Corporation Commissioner, Brian Van Camp, is quoted in BAR-
RON'S, Mar. 5, 1973, at 21, col. 2, as stating that the options violate the California
bucket shop act. This proposition will soon be tested, since the Commission, through
the Los Angeles District Attorney, has secured a forty-count grand theft and bucket
shop indictment against Feta Kandriu. State v. Kandriu, Case No. 300,860 (Cal. Super.
Ct., L.A. County, filed Sept. 20, 1973). The securities administrators of Colorado and
Utah have taken similar positions. In re Commodity Options, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP.
9722 (Colo. Sec. Comm'n May 22, 1973); In re Commodity Options, Notice and
Order, 3 BLuE SKY L. REP. 47,656 (Utah See. Comm'n Mar. 2, 1973); Explanatory
Notice and Order to the Utah Investing Public, Utah Sec. Comm'n (Mar. 16, 1973).
The Georgia Attorney General also has issued a formal opinion that stock option
contracts (see note 1 supra) may violate that state's bucket shop act if the parties do
not intend to settle by actual delivery. 1971 Op. Arr'y GEN. (Ga.) 141.
58. A"bucket shop" is "a place where wagers are made on the fluctuations of the
market price of grain and other commodities." Bergstrom v. Ridgway Co., 138 App.
Div. 178, 181, 123 N.Y.S. 29, 32 (1910), quoting Bryant v. Western Union Tel. Co., 17
F. 825, 828 (C.C. Ky. 1883). Professor Loss describes the operation of a bucket shop
as follows: "The customer may think he is effecting a legitimate purchase, but the
broker 'buckets' the order instead of executing it. If the market goes down, as the
broker hopes, he purports to sell the customer out and pockets the difference; if it goes
up and the broker is not able or willing to cover from profits on other transactions, he
either defaults or decamps." 1 L. Loss, SEcuIUris REGuLATiON 39 n.62 (2d ed. 1961).
See also BARRON'S, Mar. 5, 1973, at 21, col. 2.
59. See, e.g., OaLA. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 561-70 (1971). The key provision is section 564,
which provides in pertinent part:
Any contract of sale for the future delivery of cotton, grain, stocks or
other commodities, which is to be settled according to or upon the basis of
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Furthermore, the Georgia Commissioner has announced that if viola-
tions of that state's "bucket shop" act are established, naked options
may not be registered as securities, even if all other registration require-
ments are satisfied.6" The state securities authorities, unlike their federal
counterparts, have the ability, either directly"' or through their "fair, just,
and equitable" powers,6 2 to prevent a registration which violates pro-
visions of state law outside the securities area. Consequently, even if
naked options are classified as securities and thus made subject to the
registration and antifraud provisions of a state's securities act, such
options may nonetheless fail to qualify for registration because their
sale contravenes a law not directly pertaining to the sale of securities.
If the position taken by the Georgia Commissioner is adopted by admin-
istrators in other states, it would appear that the naked commodity op-
tion industry may be forced to change its settlement procedure or go
out of business.6"
The settlement procedures in naked option transactions represent a
significant departure from the normal option trading pattern. It may
be that the holder of a London or Mocatta put option often will not have
the underlying futures in his inventory and must therefore purchase
them in the market immediately before exercising his option. Likewise,
the public market quotations or prices made on any board of trade, exchange
or similar institutions, upon which contracts of. sale for future delivery are
executed and dealt in without any actual bona fide execution and the carry-
ing out or discharge of such contracts upon the floor of such exchange
... in accordance with the rules thereof, shall be null and void and unen-
forceable in any court of this State, and no action shall lie thereon at the
suit of any party thereto.
See also Jacobs v. Sam I. Hynds & Co., 83 Okla. 20, 200 P. 162 (1921). Section 567
makes the operation of a bucket shop a criminal offense.
60. Commodities Trading, supra note 23.
61. See, e.g., Uniform Securities Act § 306(a) (D) (1956), which provides that a
securities administrator may refuse registration of any security if "the issuer's enter-
prise or method of business includes or would include activities which are illegal
where performed."
62. See, e.g., Om. REv. STAT. § 59.105 (1971), which provides that the Commissioner
may deny registration if the "proposed plan of business of the issuer, the characteristics
and terms of the securities to be sold or the proposed methods of sale and distribution
are unfair, unjust or inequitable."
63. In states in which. it has been settled by statute that commodity options are
securities but where they remain exempt from regulation, as presently is the case in
Oklahoma and Wisconsin, their sale may be regulated through rules governing the
activities of brokers and agents. The Oklahoma Administrator, for example, can
prevent sales to the small unsophisticated investor by enforcing "know your customer"
and "suitability" rules. Okla. Sec. Comm'n Rule R-204(G), 2 BLUE SKY L. REP.
T 39,605 (1970).
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the holder of a conventional call option in many cases will dispose of
the futures immediately upon taking delivery from the option dealer.
The profit derived from a London or Mocatta option, however, is not
necessarily tied to the difference between the striking price and the cur-
rent market price, as is the case with a naked option. The holder of the
put could have owned the futures at the time he purchased the option
or acquired them at some time during the life of the option. Similarly,
the holder of the call could have sold the futures short and exercised
his option in order to cover his sales, or he could have taken delivery
and held the futures for sale at a later date.
By limiting, either tacitly or by contract, the optionee's right to one
of repurchase of the option by the dealer rather than actual exchange of
the underlying futures, the option dealer is restricting the option holder's
possible range of profit opportunities and thereby materially altering
the normal option pattern. Apparently, the vast majority of naked op-
tion purchasers accept this limitation as the price they must pay for
speculating in the commodities market. Otherwise, they would be un-
able to participate in this type of trading, since they do not maintain
the commodity trading accounts necessary to consummate actual ex-
change of futures contracts. 64
The holder of a conventional commodity option normally realizes
a profit by buying or selling the underlying futures contracts in the
market. In the naked option transaction, however, the source of the
option holder's profit is the contractual promise of the dealer to pay
on a specified date the difference between the striking price and the
current market value of the underlying futures. As a consequence, the
option holder assumes the risk that the dealer will not conduct his
affairs in such manner that he will be able to meet his contractual ob-
ligations. He has, in effect, invested money in a business in the manage-
ment of which he does not participate.
An analysis of the significant differences between conventional and
naked commodity options demonstrates that the parties to a naked
option contract adopt the name and form of the conventional option
but do not intend to create the rights and obligations normally associated
with that transactional arrangement. In reality, the naked commodity
64. Cf. Testimony, supra note 33, at 77, 89. A similar inability of the investor to
take actual delivery of. scotch whiskeys because he did not have necessary licenses and
permits was a factor in a determination that whiskey warehouse receipts were securities
in SEC v. Haffenden-Rimar Int'l, Inc, 362 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. Va. 1973). See also-
SEC v. MA. Lundy Assoc., 362 F. Supp. 226 (D.R.I. 1973); Pa. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 49,
3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 71,094 (July 17, 1973).
1973]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
option is not an option at all, since the option holder rarely can demand
delivery of the underlying futures contracts. It is submitted that a
piercing glance through the form to the substance of the transaction
clearly reveals that the naked option contract is a security within the
definition of that term in state and federal securities laws. Indeed,
there are several theories which can be utilized to subject naked options
to regulation.
THEORIES SUPPORTING THE INCLUSION OF THE NAKED COMMODITY
OPTION CONTRACT WITHIN THE DEFINITION OF A "SECURITY"
The definition of a security is the obvious starting point in examining
arguments for inclusion of naked commodity option contracts within
existing regulatory mechanisms. Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of
1933 provides as follows:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond,
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or par-
ticipation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certifi-
cate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share,
investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit
for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other
mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly
kno'wn as a "security," or any certificate of interest or participa-
tion in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee
of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
foregoing.65
This definition was adopted with only minor variations into the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 193466 and the Uniform Securities Act,67 the
latter of which serves as the basis for the blue sky laws of over 30 states
and territories;6 8 definitions in securities laws of the remaining states
also are similar to that in the Securities Act. Consequently, unless other-
wise indicated, the discussion which follows will be based upon the
definition of a security set forth above.
It has been argued that the naked commodity option contract may
come within any one of the following four categories of the standard
65. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970) (emphasis supplied).
66. Id. § 78c(10).
67. UN FoRM SEcUr ITEs Acr § 401 (1) (1956).
68. 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 4901 (1973) indicates that 29 states, the District of Colum-
bia, and Puerto Rico have adopted the Act. Delaware must now be added to this
list. See Del. Laws 1973, H.B. 416, reprinted in 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 11,102 (1973).
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definition of a security: (1) evidence of indebtedness; (2) investment
contract; (3) any interest or instrument commonly known as a "se-
curity"; or, (4) a guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase, any of the foregoing.6 9
Guarantee of or Right to Purchase Any of the Foregoing
The position that the "new" options are securities because they come
within the "guarantee of, or . . . right to . . . purchase, any of the
foregoing" portion of the definition is the weakest of the four arguments
for classifying the naked option as a security. The key aspect of this
provision is the phrase "any of the foregoing," which refers to the
other parts of the definition of a security. Thus, if someone other than
the holder of an evidence of indebtedness or investment contract guar-
antees that evidence or contract, the guarantee is itself a security sep-
arate and apart from the evidence of indebtedness or investment con-
tract.7° The same would be true of a right to purchase a bond or
corporate stock. The guarantee or right to purchase, however, cannot
be deemed a security unless that which is guaranteed or of which there
is a right to purchase can also be classified as a security.
Applying this analysis to option transactions generally, it is clear
that an option is a right to purchase or sell, and, therefore, that the first
requirement of the classification is satisfied. A cursory reading of the
limited treatments given options by Professor Loss7' and Mr. Bloomen-
69. In Delaware, Hawaii, and Oklahoma, the problem recently has been settled by
amending the definition of a security specifically to include options on commodity
futures. Del. Laws 1973, H.B. 416, § 2(m), reprinted in 1 BLurF SKY L. REP. 11,102
(1973); Hawaii Laws 1973, Act 208, § 1, reprinted in 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 14,701
(1973); OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 2(20)(0) (1971), as amended by Okla. Laws 1973, H.B.
1035, 1 (May 15, 1973).
70. 1 L. Loss, SEcURITEs REGULA ON 467 (2d ed. 1961). This situation may arise in the
naked option market. Because of the obvious risk involved in the sale of naked op-
tions, several companies have attempted to allay customer fears by establishing a guar-
antee of the option. In the case of the options sold by King Commodity Co., the
literature indicated that the options were "guaranteed" by Investor's Guaranty Corp.
King Commodity Co., Commodity Options, What Can They Do for You? 3 (undated,
issued Spring 1973). It subsequently was established that Investor's Guaranty Corp.
was not a separate corporation but a fictitious name used by King Commodity. State
v. King Commodity Co., Civ. A. No. 73-7339G (Tex. Dist. Ct., Dallas County, Oct.
18, 1973). If the naked option is a security, a guaranty of the option is also a security.
See Brief for State at 7, State v. King Commodity Co., supra. Cf. Shapiro v. First Fed-
erated Commodity Trust Co., 3 BLUR SKY L. REP. 71,058 (Md. Cir. Ct., Baltimore
County, Feb. 27, 1973).
71. 1 L. Loss, Scumnais REGuLAION 467-69 (2d ed. 1961). See also 4 id. at 2493-95
(1969 supp. to 2d ed.).
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tha 72 would suggest that the second criterion also is fulfilled. Indeed, at
least one agency has cited these authorities as supporting its conclusion
that the commodity futures underlying commodity options are securi-
ties and thus that the options themselves are securities. 73 A more care-
ful reading, however, reveals that both authors limit their discussions
to the stock option, in which case the underlying stock clearly is a
security.74
A series of recent federal district court cases have held that commodity
futures contracts75 are not securities. 76 Since this position is supported
by dicta in at least two federal appellate decisions 7 7 it would appear that
72. 1 H. BLooMENTRAL, SECURmES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 2.21 (1972).
73. Letter from Beverly B. Hall, Ass't Att'y Gen., State of Oregon, to the Honorable
Frank Healy, Corp. Comm'r, State of Oregon, Jan. 26, 1973.
74. See note 1 supra. Professor Loss cites two cases to support his position: SEC
v. Todd, Litig. Rel. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (consent decree); Shearson, Hammill & Co,
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743 (1965). The SEC recently has refused
to issue no action letters in this area. Volt Sec. Corp., SEc. REG. & L. REP. No. 144, at
C-2 (no action letter, Mar. 22, 1972); Dean Witter & Co., [1971-72 transfer binder]
CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 78,602 (no action letter, Dec. 6, 1971). See also Gates, The
Developing Option Market: Regulatory Issues and New Investor Interest, 25 U. FLA.
L. REv. 421, 437-50 (1973).
75. Although it is not the purpose of this Article to discuss the intricacies of the
commodity futures market, the following statement by the Georgia Securities Com-
missioner provides an excellent summary of the economic purposes of this unique
investment device:
[A commodity future] is simply a contract to buy and sell a specified
quantity of a specified commodity on a specified date in the future. Both the
producer and the consumer of commodities find such contracts extremely
useful. It enables the farmer to plant his crop in the spring and sell it
then, thus freeing him of the necessity of speculating on what the price
will be when his crop matures. It enables consumers of commodities, such
as mills, to know in advance what the cost of their raw materials will be
and frees them from speculating on future prices.
Through the years, the necessity of bringing potential buyers and sellers
of commodities futures contracts together has caused commodities exchanges
to be formed. These exchanges have also attracted large numbers of specu-
lators who are willing to assume the speculative risk that the producers
and consumers of commodities wish to be rid of. These speculators there-
fore perform a valuable service to producers and consumers of commodities,
making the market "liquid" by their willingness to buy and sell at the cur-
rent market price.
Commodities Trading, supra note 23, at 10,503.
76. See, e.g., McCurnin v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 340 F. Supp. 1338 (E.D. La. 1972);
Schwartz v. Bache & Co., 340 F. Supp. 995 (S.D. Iowa 1972); Sinva v. Merrill, Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 253 F. Supp. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
77. Commercial Iron & Metal Co. v. Bache & Co., 478 F.2d 39 (10th Cir. 1973);
Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
887 (1972).
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for purposes of the federal securities laws, commodity futures con-
tracts, by themselves, will not be treated as securities. Two reasons may
be utilized to justify this result at the federal level. First, because of the
independent development of the commodities and securities markets,
Congress created a separate system of regulating commodities under the
Commodities Exchange Act.78 Since this statute has been construed as
creating a private cause of action79 similar to that found under SEC
Rule 10b-5, 80 it would appear unnecessary to employ the federal secu-
rities laws to protect investors in commodity futures.81
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the dominant theme in the
recent history of securities regulation is that in order for an investment
to be a security, the investor must be passive and derive his profits from
the active management of some other person.82 Probably the most
78. 7 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970).
79. See, e.g., Booth v. Peavey Co. Commodity Servs., 430 F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1970).
80. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973).
81. It is interesting to note, however, that the "bucket shop" acts (see notes 57-59
supra & accompanying text) regulate spurious trading in both commodities and stocks.
See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 562, 564 (1971). There is thus some precedent for joint
control under a single system of regulation.
82. An examination of cases interpreting early state securities acts indicates that the
purpose of these statutes was not merely to protect passive investors but to provide
a broad range of protection. For example, the court in State v. Gopher Tire &
Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 177 N.W. 937, 938 (1920), applying a standard dictionary
definition, stated that an investment involves "Ithe placing of capital or laying out of
money in a way intended to secure income or profit from its employment" and con-
cluded that any contract involving such an investment is a security. Under this
definition, almost any investment, be it in real property, commodity futures, or
an annuity-type insurance policy, would come within the definition of a security.
Today in some states there are lingering vestiges of this early concept, as is evidenced
by the continued classification as securities of investments in real property, particularly
if located outside the state. See, e.g., Omo R,. CODE ANN. § 1707.01 (B) (1964); TEN.
CODE ANx. § 48-1602(J) (1964). However, following the enactment of the federal
securities acts and the subsequent definition of an investment contract by the Supreme
Court in SEC v. WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946), to be considered in detail in
a subsequent section, the trend, reaching a peak in the late 1950's and 1960's, was to
hold that an instrument would not be deemed a security unless it was traded in the
normal securities market. Because of the reemergence of promotional schemes such
as those of Glenn Turner and the founder-membership crowd (apparently, this
type of scheme has been with us as long as securities regulation (see note 147
infra)), courts have rediscovered the original intent of the securities acts and now
are applying a broad definition of a security to such investment transactions.
See, e.g., SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Entrp., Inc, 348 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ore. 1972), aff'd,
474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 117 (1973); State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center,
Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971). See also State v. Investors Security Corp,
- Minn. -, 209 N.W.2d 405 (1973). For a discussion of some of the early cases,
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famous expression of this concept is found in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,8 3
in which the Supreme Court enunciated the classic definition of an in-
vestment contract as "a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a
person invests his money in a cozmmon enterprise and is led to expect
profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party .... , 84
Thus, under the Howey test, an investment contract is a security only
where there is a common enterprise and only if the management of that
enterprise is left in the hands of someone other than the investor.
As will be discussed in a subsequent section, the courts have ex-
perienced some difficulty in applying the Howey test to particular
factual situations. Nevertheless, it would seem clear that commodity
futures contracts do not satisfy either the common enterprise or third
party management requirements of the definition.85 Since the commodity
investor decides what futures contracts to invest in and when he will
buy or sell, he exercises complete control over his investment and is en-
tirely responsible for its profitability. Obviously, there is no common
enterprise involved because the investor acts alone.
On the other hand, a slight alteration in this pattern may bring the
transaction within the Howey definition of an investment contract. If
the investor pays an expert to select the futures to be purchased, to
decide when they should be sold, or to care for the underlying com-
modities, his agreement with the expert should be classified as a security.8 6
In this situation, however, it is important to note that it is the transac-
tional arrangement the parties have selected, and not the commodity
see Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of Securi-
ties Regulatim 24 Oia.A. L. REv. 135 (1971).
83. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
84. Id. at 298-99 (emphasis supplied).
85. This blanket statement should be qualified to the extent that if the person offering
the commodity futures contracts originally does not have the underlying commodities
to deliver on the date agreed upon, the situation is similar to the sale of a naked com-
modity option contract, since in both cases the purchaser must assume the additional
enterprise risk that the person issuing the contract will be unable to perform. The
Georgia Securities Commissioner recently indicated that in such circumstances, he con-
siders a commodity futures contract as much an investment contract as he does a naked
option. Commodities Trading, supra note 23.
86. Cf., e.g., SEC v. Haffenden-Rimar Int'l, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. Va. 1973)
(whiskey warehouse receipts); SEC v. M.A. Lundy Assoc., 362 F. Supp. 226 (D.R.I.
1973) (same); SEC v. First Leisure Corp., Civ. A. No. 72-2616-RJK (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3,
1972) (consent decree) (discretionary trading account in commodity options); Berman
v. Orimex Trading, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (discretionary trading ac-
count).
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futures, which constitutes the security."7 As a result of this agree-
ment, the investor furnishes the capital which the expert agrees to
invest in the commodities market in order to achieve the common enter-
prise's profitmaking objective. Since the commodity futures in this
situation are nothing more than the medium used to generate the profit,
the same result would obtain if any other medium, such as real estate
investment or cattle feeding, were used."8
The status of commodity futures under state blue sky laws is less clear.
In two states, Oklahoma 9 and Wisconsin,"0 commodity futures are
specifically included within the definition of a security. In both cases,
however, they are exempted from registration requirements. Statutory
coverage, therefore, is limited to antifraud provisions and dealer regis-
tration requirements for firms selling the futures contracts. Three other
states include warehouse receipts within the definition of a security.91
Because most futures contracts are not settled by the actual delivery of
the commodity, but rather by the negotiation of a warehouse receipt, it
can be argued that in these states the futures contract is a security be-
cause it is a "temporary or interim certificate for" or "receipt for"
another security, the warehouse receipt.
Even in the vast majority of states which have adopted a definition
of a security similar to that in the federal securities laws, the argument
has been made that commodity futures are investment contracts. Prior
to the passage of the new Wisconsin statute specifically including com-
modity futures within the definition of a security, for example, the Wis-
consin Commissioner took this position in an administrative release.9?
87. See SEC v. Wickham, 12 F. Supp. 245 (D. Minn. 1935). The agreement can be
a security even though it is not in writing and there is only an informal under-
standing between the parties. Commercial Iron & Metal Co. v. Bache & Co., 478 F.2d
39 (10th Cir. 1973); Berman v. Orimex Trading, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
88. SEC v. Lake Havasu Estates, 340 F. Supp. 1318 (D. Minn. 1972) (land); People
v. Witzerman, 29 Cal. App. 3d 169, 105 Cal. Rptr. 284 (Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (cattle
feeding); State v. Investors Security Corp, - Minn. -, 209 N.W.2d 405 (1973).
89. OKA. STAT. tit. 71, § 2(20) (0) (1971), as anzended by Okla. Laws 1973, H.B.
1035, § 1 (May 15, 1973). Coverage of. this statute is limited to commodities not regu-
lated by the Commodity Exchange Authority. Id.
90. Wis. STAT. § 551.02(13) (a) (1971).
91. FLA. STAT. '1 517.02 (1973); LA. REv. STAT. § 51:701(1) (1950); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 421:2 (1955).
92. Wis. S c. COMM'N, MoNTHLY Sc. BuLT. 2 (Feb. 1968), cited in 4 L. Loss, SECURI-
TIEs REjruAxioN 2504 (1969 Supp. to 2d ed.). In the statement, Commissioner Nelson,
in response to a series of questions raised by the Wisconsin bar, indicated his belief
that commodity futures fell within those portions of the Wisconsin definition of a
security dealing with "investment contracts" and "interests in property." This latter
portion of the definition was dropped when the new Wisconsin law was enacted.
19731
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
His announcement was in the form of a brief statement of policy, how-
ever, and did not contain a discussion or citation of authority.93
There are special reasons for treating commodity futures as invest-
ment contracts under the state securities laws. Unlike the situation at
the federal level, only one state has legislation specifically regulating the
sale of commodity futures contracts.9 4 Thus, in an attempt to provide
needed protection to the commodities investor, state courts and securities
commissions may feel compelled to hold that commodities futures are
investment contracts and thus securities within the conventional defi-
nition. 5 Although such an approach might be tempting, it is difficult
to support under existing definitions of an "investment contract."
As will be indicated, the states generally have accepted, with some
modifications, the basic definition of an "investment contract" estab-
lished by the Supreme Court in Howey. One modification which has
received recent acceptance by a few courts is the elimination of the
common enterprise requirement.98 Even with this alteration, however,
it remains clear that the commodity futures purchaser is still the master
of his own destiny and is not relying upon someone else to make in-
vestment decisions for him. Indeed, the presence or absence of the
ability to make management and investment decisions, and thereby to
control the success or failure of the investment, has been the key to the
coverage of modern state and federal securities laws. Until such time as
the state courts abandon this concept in favor of the older and much
broader basis for securities status, 7 commodity futures contracts, stand-
ing alone, will not be classified as securities. If the futures contracts
underlying a commodity option cannot be deemed securities, the option
93. More recently, the author argued this position for the Oklahoma Securities Com-
mission in its case against Goldstein Samuelson. Legal Memorandum of the Staff at
3-4, In re Goldstein Samuelson, Inc., 3 BLuE SKY L. REP. T1 71,095 (Okla. Sec. Comm'n
Feb. 23, 1973).
94. Cal. Laws 1973, Ch. 854, WEsT CAL. Litis. Ssiv. 1714-31 (Sept. 25, 1973). The
act regulates the exchanges, dealers, and agents selling futures contracts, but not the
contracts themselves. In addition, it covers commodity transactions not regulated under
the federal act, that is, the so-called "world" commodities, such as silver, coffee, and
plywood.
95. Cf. Brief for Plaintiff at 3, Shapiro v. First Federated Commodity Trust Co., 3
BLT'E SKY L. REP. T 71,058 (Md. Cir. Ct., Baltimore County, Feb. 27, 1973).
96. Shapiro v. First Federated Commodity Trust Co., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. T 71,071
(Md. Cir. Ct., Baltimore County, May 30, 1973); State v. Investors Security Corp.,
- Minn. -, 209 N.W.2d 405 (1973). See also 5 CAL. CORP. COMM'R OFIIAL OP.
73/42C (Mar. 20, 1973).
97. See note 82 supra.
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itself cannot be classified as "a guarantee of... or right to purchase"
a security.
Evidence of Indebtedness
A much stronger case can be made for the inclusion of naked com-
modity options within the portion of the standard definition of a se-
curity pertaining to evidences of indebtedness. Unfortunately, as with
most of the general categories within the definition, the concept of
"evidence of indebtedness" has not received extensive treatment by the
courts, agencies, or legal scholars. This is not to say that many of the
more common forms of indebtedness have escaped securities regulation.98
For example, the standard definition of a security specifically categorizes
and includes bonds, debentures, and promissory notes. In addition, other
common forms of indebtedness, such as savings accounts and certificates
of deposit, generally are recognized as securities. 99
There have been a few scattered cases involving several of the more
unusual types of evidences of indebtedness. In 1931, the Wisconsin At-
torney General was asked to consider the legality of a scheme involving
the sale of coupon books with goodwill bonds attached.10 The coupon
books were priced at either $100 or $35, and the goodwill bond was
included at no additional cost. The proceeds from the sale of the coupon
books were to be used to build gas stations at which the coupons could
be redeemed. The goodwill bond provided that the company would
set aside from each sale of gasoline and oil a certain amount, which, after
a period of time or when the fund reached a given level, would be
distributed to the holders of the bonds. The attorney general ruled that
the coupon books and goodwill bonds were both evidences of indebted-
ness and therefore securities under Wisconsin law. The following year
98. In a recent development, the Interstate Commerce Commission, which has con-
trol over the securities issued by the various common carriers in the United States,
used its power to define terms to bring all common carrier debts, regardless of whether
they are evidenced by promissory notes, within the definition of a security. CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. No. 495, pt. 1, at 4 (Sept. 6, 1973).
99. SEC v. First Am. Bank & Trust Co, 481 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1973); SEC v. W.L.
Moody & Co., [1972-73 transfer binder] CCH FFz. SEC. L. REP. 93,619 (S.D. Tex.
1972); Ariz. Att'y Gen. Op., [1954-71 transfer binder] BLUE SKY L. REP. 70,246 (1954);
1 Op. Arr'y GEN. (Ohio) (Bricker) 572 (1933); 1 H. BLoomrrrnAL, Sactnrns AND FED-
ERAL CoRPoRATE LAW § 2.17 (1972). Cf. SEC v. C.H. Wagner & Co., [1971-72 transfer
binder] CCH Fm. Sac. L. RaP. 93,380 (D. Ore. 1972); SEC v. Los Angeles Trust Deed &
Morteage Exch., 186 F. Supp. 830 .(S.D. Cal.), modified, 285 F.2d 162 (1960), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961).
100. 20 Op. Airr'y GEN. (Wis.) 176 (1931).
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this characterization was sustained by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in
Brownie Oil Co. v. Railroad Commission,101 the court stating:
No doubt exists as to the purposes of the certificates. The issuing
corporation seeks, first, to have financed a particular service station
by means of customer advances, and, second, to secure the custom
and recommendation of those who purchase certificates by offering
certain returns based upon the volume of business done. It is prob-
ably not important in this action that the relations between the
certificate holder and the corporation be definitely labeled ...
This is a device for financing a corporation. The inducement to
secure this financing is the promised creation of a fund which will
later be distributed to the person making the investment or furnish-
ing the financing. This person waives his right to any interest or
dividends as such, but he does invest with the hope or expectation
that the money invested will be returned to him together with
some payment for its use. He acquires the right to have the fund
accumulated and receive his distributive share when it is accumu-
lated. He accepts the risk that the enterprise will be unable to get
into operation and that the period of its operation will be neither
sufficiently long nor successful to bring him the expected returns.10 2
More recently, in State v. Hodge,'0 a promoter was convicted of a
securities law violation for selling "Receipts in Lieu of Promissory
Contract." The receipts provided that the corporation receiving the
investment would return twice the amount listed on the face thereof
one year after the initial investment. 0 4 The Supreme Court of Kansas
stated that these receipts were evidences of indebtedness and upheld
the conviction.
A Canadian court recently considered an interesting debt instrument
in In re Sanderson and Ontario Securities Commission."°5 Using adver-
tisements in local papers, Sanderson offered to pay $70 a week for 16
weeks to anyone making a $400 initial investment. The investor could
demand a refund at any time, and his original $400, less any $70 pay-
101. 207 Wis. 88, 240 N.W. 827, 829 (1932).
102. Id. (emphasis supplied). The court held that the coupons and bonds were
securities within that portion of the Wisconsin definition including "evidence of debt,
or interest in or lien upon any or all of. the property or profits of a company." Id.
at 828.
103. 204 Kan. 98, 460 P.2d 596 (1969).
104. Cf. In re Prestige Fin. Corp., Summary Cease and Desist Order, Okla. Sec.
Comm'n (Aug. 29, 1973) (the corporation offered to return $1,900 for every $100 in-
vested).
105. 28 D.L.R.3d 171 (Ont. 1972).
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ments already received, would be returned to him. Sanderson intended
to generate a return by taking the investments to several race tracks in
the United States and betting on the ponies. When the Ontario Com-
mission ordered a halt to the sale of the agreements, Sanderson sought
judicial review. The court held that the agreements were securities
within that portion of the Ontario act covering income and annuity
contracts.'06
In most of these cases, the courts, although holding that particular
interests were securities because of their "debt" characteristics, have
not attempted to formulate a definition of the term "evidence of in-
debtedness." 107 Such an effort recently was made, however, by the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Austin.08
Austin and several other defendants sought out construction companies
in need of money to complete various projects and offered, for a price,
"letters of commitment," which, in essence, were promises by the de-
fendants to secure funds from a third party or, if a third party lender
could not be found, to advance the money themselves.10 9 In upholding
a finding that the letters of commitment were evidences of indebtedness
and thus securities, the court stated:
The term "evidence of indebtedness" is not limited to a promis-
sory note or other simple acknowledgment of a debt owing and is
held to include all contractual obligations to pay in the future for
consideration presently received.
It is true that the letter of commitment is not an indicium of
debt in the same sense as a promissory note, but as used in the Se-
106. For other cases involving unusual evidence of indebtedness, see Strauss v. State,
113 Ga. App. 90, 147 S.E.2d 367 (1966) (money orders); Donovan v. Dixon, 261 Minn.
455, 113 N.W.2d 432 (1962) (guarantee fund certificates); State ex rel. Healy v.
Cathedral of Tomorrow, Inc., 3 BLue SKY L. REP. 71,052 (Ore. Cir. Ct., Marion
County, Oct. 9, 1972) (time payment certificates).
107. Of course, the formulation of such definitions would be no problem if the
courts were willing to recognize that all securities have certain common characteris-
tics. If a court applies these characteristics in determining whether a particular instru-
ment is a security, the label that is given to that instrument (e.g., evidence of indebted-
ness or investment contract) is unimportant. For this author's catalogue of the common
characteristics of. securities, see Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts"
to the Mainstream of Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REv. 135 (1971). Unfortunately,
all too often the courts are more interested in a label than the substance of the transac-
tion.
108. 462 F.2d 724 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1048 (1972).
109. For variations on this basic fraud scheme, see MicH. Sec. Comm'N Sec. BumL.
1 (Sept. 1, 1972).
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curities Act no such restriction is appropriate. In last analysis,
this letter of commitment was sold for a substantial consideration,
and the buyer received what appeared to be an enforceable obliga-
tion which contemplated the flow of funds. It indicated a binding
and legally enforceable right. Therefore, we can find no fault with
the ruling of the trial court insofar as it regarded the letter of
commitment as plainly being a security.110
A close reading of the Austin case reveals that the court, unable to
find a definition of evidence of indebtedness in any of the reported
securities cases, applied a general common law definition drawn from
nonsecurities contexts."' Although this in itself is not an uncommon
practice,"12 the court in Austin appears to have broadened substantially
the definition it adopted, which had emphasized the obligation of the
person receiving the initial consideration to make a future payment
in return.13 In Austin, however, the obligation of the issuer of the
letters of commitment was to find a third party willing to lend money
and only in the event third-party financing could not be obtained itself
to make a loan. Nevertheless, the court held that the conditional promise
to make a loan contained in the letters of commitment constituted an
evidence of indebtedness.
Under the Austin definition, even the London or Mocatta options
could be deemed to be evidences of indebtedness. The essence of these
options, as with options in general, is that for consideration received
the optionor stands ready to buy or sell the underlying property at a
fixed price. There would seem to be little significant legal difference
between an obligation to buy or sell and an obligation to loan money.
Although neither is an unqualified obligation to pay money, under the
110. 462 F.2d at 736. The Michigan Securities Commission has taken a similar stand
on such, advance fee schemes. MIa. SEC. COMM'N SEC. BuLL. 1 (Sept. 1, 1972).
111. The court relied upon definitions supplied in Keller v. City of Scranton, 200 Pa.
130, 49 A. 781 (1901), and Nelson v. Wilson, 81 Mont. 560, 264 P. 679 (1928), as
well as in three federal cases dealing with the question of what is a security under
the Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2311 (1970): Merrill v. United States, 338 F.2d
763 (5th Cir. 1964); Barack v. United States, 317 F.2d 619 (9th Cit. 1963); United
States v. Jones, 182 F. Supp. 146 (WD. Mo. 1960).
112. See, e.g., State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 177 N.W. 937 (1920).
113. This does not mean that such an obligation to pay cannot be made condi-
tional on the happening of certain events. As will be noted subsequently, a conditional
obligation to pay money is as much an evidence of indebtedness as an absolute obliga-
tion to pay. See notes 128-31 infra & accompanying text.
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Austin rationale each is "an enforceable obligation which contemplate [s]
the flow of funds." 114
It seems unlikely that this attempt to broaden the definition of evi-
dence of indebtedness will receive widespread acceptance.11 Even so,
the decision in Austin stands as support for the argument that the naked
commodity option is an evidence of indebtedness for securities classifi-
cation purposes. As noted earlier,116 the dealer in naked options, instead
of making a delivery of the underlying futures contracts, "repurchases"
the option from the contract holder, paying him the difference between
the current market price and the option striking price. In some cases,
the sales literature specifically indicates that this is the way the transac-
tons are to be handled. For example, one dealer in its literature states:
"First Federated Commodity Option Company is the granter of the op-
tons and guarantees upon demand to redeem any and all Options, either
Put or Call, or Put and Call (Double Options) which have been duly
registered on its books, for their value." 117 In other cases, it appears that
the essence of the buy-back agreement, although not specifically men-
tioned in the sales literature, is conveyed to the customer as a part of
the sales promotion. 118 Furthermore, it would appear the first genera-
tion naked option firms apparently all had the policy of automatically
repurchasing any option in which the holder had a "profit" on the last
day of the option period, even if they had not received instructions
from the holder to do so. It is submitted that this automatic repurchase
feature converts the option dealer's obligation from one to buy or sell
the underlying futures contracts to one to pay a monetary return at
some time in the future and thus brings it within the definition of an
"evidence of indebtedness" as applied by the Austin court.
114. 462 F.2d at 736.
115. See Wisconsin S. Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. T 71,046
(Wis. Cir. Cr., Dane County, May 8, 1972), rejecting the claim that an agreement to
purchase stock in another corporation was an evidence of indebtedness within the
meaning of either the securities act or the public service act.
It will be seen that many of the instruments which appear to fall within the extended
scope of the Austin test for an evidence of indebtedness may also be classified as in-
vestment contracts.
116. See notes 50-52 supra & accompanying text.
117. First Federated Commodity Option Co., The Power of Commodity Options 2-3
(undated, issued Spring 1973) (emphasis supplied). See also Goldstein Samuelson, Inc,
An Investment Opportunity 7 (undated, issued 1972), indicating that the firm would
always buy back profitable options.
118. People v. Puts and Calls, Inc, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 71,090 (Cal. Super. Ct, LA.
County, June 21, 1973).
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The discussion cannot end at this point, however. Unfortunately,
during the past 25 years there has been a growing reluctance by the
courts to include certain promissory notes or evidences of indebtedness
within the coverage of the securities acts, even though they clearly come
within the definitional language. 9  In most cases the courts have not
attempted to explain why a particular instrument is held not to be a
security, except to state that Congress or the state legislature did not
intend to include it within the coverage of the securities act.120 The
net result has been that the courts have resorted to a rather tortured
construction of the definitional language to escape inclusion.' 2 '
This conservative attitude is reflected in the decision of the Supreme
Court of Oregon that merchant trading stamps are not securities. In
explaining its position that instruments should not necessarily be deemed
securities merely because they technically fall within the categories con-
tained in statutory definitions, the court in Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v.
Hudson122 stated:
119. See, e.g., Lino v. City Investing Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,124 (3d Cir.
Aug. 20, 1973); Janssen v. Tri-Pac Dev. Corp., Civ. A. No. 72-1200 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 1,
1972); Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Mo. 1971) (all
involving promissory notes arising out of consumer sales transactions); Forman v.
Community Servs., Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP'. 94,139 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 1973)
("stock" in publicly financed co-op housing project); Wisconsin S. Gas Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 71,046 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Dane County, May
8, 1972) (evidences of indebtedness issued in connection with a purchase of corporate
stock). But see Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1009 (1972); MacAndrews & Forbes Co. v. American Barmag Corp., 339
F. Supp. 1401 (D.S.C. 1972), discussed in Long, Don't Forget the Securities Acts!, 26
OKLA. L. REv. 160 (1973).
120. See, e.g., Lino v. City Investing Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,124 (3d Cir.
Aug. 20, 1973); McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 352 F. Supp. 454 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
121. This construction takes two basic forms. The definitional provisions in most
securities acts are preceded by the statement that the definitions outlined shall govern,
unless the context otherwise requires. See, e.g., UNIFORM SECURITES ACr, § 401 (1956).
Seizing upon this language and stating its belief that the securities acts were not intended
to cover a certain type of instrument or transaction, the court then indicates either that
the instrument is not a security within the definition of a security (e.g., McClure v. First
Nat'l Bank, 352 F. Supp. 454 (N.D. Tex. 1973); Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, Inc.,
336 F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Mo. 1971)) or that there is no sale of the instrument within the
definition of "sale" (e.g., Lino v. City Investing Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,124
(3d Cir. Aug. 20, 1973); McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, supra). The soundness of these
conclusions concerning legislative intent, which is usually taken as an article of faith,
is open to question.
122. 190 Ore. 458, 226 P.2d 501 (1951). It is submitted that these stamps clearly
constitute an evidence of indebtedness, since the company is obligated to redeem them
in exchange for merchandise or cash. The further holding of the court that there
[Vol. 15:211
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The terms "evidence of indebtedness," "certificate of interest or
participation in any profit-sharing agreement," and "investment
contract" as used in the act refer only to such of those types as
are commonly known as "securities"; they contemplate the pres-
ence of the investment process, that is, "the investment of funds
•.. with a view of receiving a profit through the efforts of others
than the investor." 123
It is submitted that even under this rationale, naked options can be
classified as securities, since they are evidences of indebtedness arising
out of the investment process. The most graphic means of illustrating
this point is to compare the purchaser of a naked commodity option with
a savings account holder. It is well established that savings accounts
are evidences of indebtedness of the investment type and thus clearly
within the coverage of the securities acts. 124 The savings account holder
turns his money over to the bank in exchange for its promise to pay
him a certain rate of interest; the bank must reinvest this money in
order to generate sufficient funds to pay that interest. Although the
investor in no way shares in the investment decisions of the bank's
officers and directors, he must bear the risk of their making unsound or
unproductive investments, as a result of which the bank will be unable
to pay the promised interest.
was no "sale" of the stamps within the meaning of the act also is suspect. The
standard definition of. "sale" in the securities acts indicates that whenever a security
is received as a bonus on any other purchase, the security is considered to constitute a
part of the purchase and therefore sold for value. See, e.g., UNIFoamV SEcUamREs Act
§ 401 (j) (3) (1956). It is interesting to note that almost twenty years earlier, the
Oregon Attorney General, taking the language of the statute at face value, held a
somewhat similar stamp plan to be a security. [1932-34] Op. ATr'Y GEN. (Ore.) 499
(1933).
123. 190 Ore. at -, 226 P.2d at 505 (emphasis supplied). It should be apparent that
this formulation is essentially the Howey test for an investment contract. The Oregon
court, however, took this quotation from the definition of a security found in 37
CJ. Licenses § 168 (1925). For a detailed discussion of this test and an expansion of
the theme that there are certain factors common to all securities, see Long, An Attempt
to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA.
L. REv. 135 (1971).
124. SEC v. First Am. Bank & Trust Co., 481 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1973); SEC v. W.L.
Moody & Co., [1972-73 transfer binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 93,619 (S.D. Tex.
1972); Ariz. Att'y Gen. Op., [1954-71 transfer binder] BLUE SKY L. REP. 70,246 (1954);
I Op. ATr'y GEN. (Ohio) (Bricker) 572 (1933). Cf. Reiger v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d
618 (6th Cir. 1943); Young v. Seaboard Corp., 360 F. Supp. 490 (D. Utah 1973); SEC
v. C.H. Wagner & Co, [1971-72 transfer binder] CCH FED. Sac. L. REP. 93,380
(D. Ore. 1972).
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The buyer of a naked option assumes a similar risk when he opens
an account with an option dealer. The investor is sold an option con-
tract, and, in exchange for a fee or premium, the dealer agrees to re-
purchase the option on a specified date. Thus, like the savings account
holder, the purchaser of a naked option expects to receive a monetary
return from the person to whom he has given his funds. The option
dealer functions much like a bank, in that it must use option premiums
to generate the funds necessary to honor its repurchase obligations. 125
All investment decisions are made by the dealer, and, as has been demon-
strated by the bankruptcy of most of the first generation option firms, 126
the investor bears the risk that the dealer will not be in a position to
honor its obligation to repurchase. 127
The analogy between savings accounts and naked option contracts
admittedly is imperfect. Nevertheless, it is submitted that there is no
distinction between the two transactional arrangements relevant to the
question of securities classification. It might be argued, for example, that
the savings account holder's right to receive payment of his interest
is absolute, while the option holder can profit only if there is a fluctua-
tion in the price of a particular commodity futures contract. 2  Many
125. Unlike banks, however, most option dealers are very thinly capitalized and, as
investigation of the first generation option companies has revealed, rarely have the
opportunity to undertake significant investment.
126. See, e.g., In re Traders Int'l, Ltd., Bankruptcy No. 7350 (D. Nev. Aug. 23, 1973)
(decision of the referee that commodity options are securities); In re Puts and Calls, Inc.,
Civ. A. No. 73-02706 (C.D. Cal., filed May 3, 1973). It has been estimated that losses
to option holders, including premiums and profits from options exercised, have ex-
ceeded $100 million. The Wall Street Journal (SW ed.), June 28, 1973, at 32, col. 1.
Some of these losses may be recouped if the bankruptcy courts follow the lead of. the
court in Traders International and hold that the options are securities, since a strong
argument can be made that the purchaser of an unregistered security who rescinds his
transaction stands ahead of, or on a par with, other general creditors of a corporation.
See Slain and Kripke, The Interface Between Securities Regulation and Bankruptcy-
Allocating the Risk of Illegal Securities Issuance Between Securityholders and the
Issuer's Creditors, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 261 (1973).
127. Cf. People v. Puts and Calls, Inc., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 71,090 (Cal. Super. Ct.,
LA. County, June 21, 1973).
128. It is really a misnomer to refer to naked options as "futures options," since the
only part played by the futures market in the option transaction is in determining the
amount of the holder's profit. Obviously, any other measuring device subject to un-
predictable variations would serve the same function. For example, the contract could
provide that the holder would be entitled to one dollar for every degree that the
temperature fell below, or rose above, the mean average temperature in Oklahoma
City on any given day between July 1 and December 31. The commodity market
was no doubt selected to give the contracts an investment flavor, while avoiding any
superficial connection with the securities market.
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securities, however, such as preferred stock, provide that payments will
be made only upon the happening of certain specified events.129
The insignificance of the conditionality of an obligation to pay for
purposes of classification as an evidence of indebtedness is demonstrated
by Curtis v. Johson,130 which involved a rather unusual trust receipt
agreement contemplating the eventual formation of a limited partner-
ship. Once the partnership was formed the receipt holder could demand
the return of his investment with interest for the period it was held.
In rejecting the argument that the receipts were not evidences of in-
debtedness because the obligation to pay was conditional, the court
observed: "The mere fact that the trust receipt provides for a redemp-
tion or repayment under certain conditions and at times selected by the
promoters, i.e., at such time as '... the Limited Partnership Agreement
is ready to be executed, ... ' does not make it any less a certificate of
indebtedness .... ." 11
A second arguable difference between the two investment mediums
is that normally the savings account holder receives a fixed return, while
the option holder's return is governed by the changes in price of the
underlying commodity futures. Although debt obligations generally
are thought of as carrying a fixed rate of return, this is not always the
case. The interest rates of many large commercial loans and newer
mortgages, for example, often vary according to changes in the prime
lending rate, which is set by the larger banks in New York City. Fur-
thermore, the interest on savings accounts technically is not fixed, since
the practice in recent years has been for banks to pay the "highest in-
terest allowable by law." In reality, the interest rates on savings ac-
counts follow the changes in the maximum rates permitted by the Fed-
eral Reserve Board. It is significant, moreover, that irrespective of
the agency making the adjustment in interest rates (FRB, investment
bank, or local bank), the variation is caused by external factors, either
economic or governmental, which are beyond the control of either the
savings account holder or the bank.132
129. For example, the dividend may be payable only out of earnings and profits.
In addition, preferred dividends are often noncumulative, which basically means that
preferred shareholders have no right to dividends unless they are declared by the
board of directors.
130. 92 I1. App. 2d 141,234 N.E.2d 566 (1968).
131. Id. at 150, 234 N.E.2d at 571.
132. It might also be argued that savings accounts and naked options should be
treated differently because the option holder actively participates in the determination
of his return by selecting which option to buy and how long to hold it. Since this
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In summary, it is clear that naked commodity option contracts are
within the broad definition of an evidence of indebtedness outlined in
Austin, as well as the more stringent standard, requiring that the transac-
tion arise out of an investment situation, set forth in Sperry & Hutchin-
son. This conclusion is made manifest by consideration of the similari-
ties between savings accounts, which clearly are securities, and naked
options. Despite insignificant differences between the two forms of
transaction, the basic economic effect of the two is the same, and they
therefore should be treated alike for purposes of securities classifica-
tion.133
Investment Contracts
An equally strong argument can be made for including naked com-
modity option contracts within the investment contracts category of
the definition of a security.134 Much has been written on the attempts
of courts and legal scholars to arrive at an adequate definition of an
investment contract. Although it is not the purpose of this Article to
give a full account of these efforts,'35 it will be necessary to describe the
argument relates to that portion of the Howey definition of an investment contract
requiring that profits be derived "solely" through the efforts of others, full treatment
of this issue will be reserved until the next section. However, two comments should
be made at this point. First, the savings account holder in part determines his return
by selecting the institution and the type of account in which he will deposit his money.
The government traditionally has permitted savings and loan institutions to pay a
slightly higher rate of return than commercial banks on the same type of passbook
account. Furthermore, most banks offer different rates of interest depending upon the
length of time funds are invested and the amount of notice required for withdrawal.
Of course, the savings account holder also in part determines his return by deciding
when to withdraw his money.
In any event, investor participation under the Howey test does not mean participa-
tion in the determination of the amount of the return but rather participation in the
management and investment decisions leading to the generation of a return. The
Howey test thus considers whether the investor has a say with respect to whether he
will receive any return on his investment.
133. Naked commodity options were held to be "evidences of indebtedness" under
the Oklahoma statute in In re Goldstein Samuelson, Inc., 3 BLuE SKY L. REP. 71,095
(Okla. Sec. Comm'n Feb. 23, 1973).
134. People v. Puts and Calls, Inc, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 71,090 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A.
County, June 21, 1973); Shapiro v. First Federated Commodity Trust Co., 3 BLUE SKY
L. REP. 71,071 (Md. Cir. Ct., Baltimore County, May 30, 1973). But see SEC v. Con-
tinental Commodity Corp., Civ. A. No. 3-6976-D (N.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 1973); International
Commodit, Trust. Inc. v. Fisher, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 71,075 (Okla. Dist. Ct., Oklahoma
County, May 14, 1973).
135. See, e.g., Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More
Meaningful Formula?, 18 W. Rs. L. REv. 367 (1967); Long, An Attempt to Return
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controversy which has surrounded this definition in order to develop
the argument that naked options should be deemed investment contracts.
In drafting the first comprehensive federal legislation dealing with
securities regulation, Congress borrowed many concepts and features
from existing state securities laws. Indeed, the definition of a security
in the Securities Act of 1933 contains many general terms, such as "in-
vestment contract," which were derived from state statutes. However,
as noted in the now-famous case of State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber
Co.,'13 state legislatures had left to the courts the task of providing
definitions for these terms, including "investment contract."
The first Supreme Court decision to consider this definitional category
was SEC v. C.AI. Joiner Leasing Corp.1" 7 The Court wisely refused
to enunciate a comprehensive definition of an investment contract, be-
lieving that any such definition would be evaded immediately by the
development of new financing interests. Instead, the Court held that
the oil leases and accompanying test well drilling contracts sold by the
defendant corporation were securities on the ground that "trading in
these documents had all the evils inherent in the securities transactions
which it was the aim of the Securities Act to end." 13 In addition, the
Court noted that the descriptive terms within the definition of a security,
such as "investment contract" and "transferable share," created generic
rather than specific classifications:
We cannot read out of the statute these general descriptive desig-
nations merely because more specific ones have been used to reach
some ldnds of documents. Instruments may be included within
any of these definitions, as matter of law, if on their face they
answer to the name or description. However, the reach of the
Act does not stop with the obvious and commonplace. Novel, un-
common, or irregular devices, whatever they appear to be, are
"Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REV.
135 (1971). For excellent summaries of developments within the last several years,
see Note, Pyranid Schemes: Dare to Be Regulated, 61 GEO. L.J. 1257 (1973); Note,
Regulation of Pyranid Sales Ventures, 15 WM. & MARY L. REv. 117 (1973); 51 Tax.
L. REv. 788 (1973).
136. 146 Minn. 52, 177 N.W. 937 (1920). In Gopher Tire, the Supreme Court of
Minnesota determined that certificates issued in consideration of a sum paid by the
purchaser and of his assistance in promoting a sale of. goods manufactured by the cor-
poration were not contracts for the performance of services by agents but rather were
within the scope of the state's statute listing investment contracts as securities.
137. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
138. Id. at 349.
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also reached if it be proved as matter of fact that they were widely
offered or dealt in under terms or courses of dealing which
established their character in commerce as "investment con-
tracts," .... 139
In rejecting the defendants' argument that their offerings were beyond
the scope of the Securities Act because they purported to convey only
interests in real estate, the Court stated: "The test rather is what charac-
ter the instrument is given in commerce by the terms of the offer, the
plan of distribution, and the economic inducements held out to the
prospect. In the enforcement of an act such as this it is not inappro-
priate that promoters' offerings be judged as being what they were
represented to be." 140
In SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,141 decided just three years after Joiner,
the Supreme Court did an about-face and held that "an investment con-
tract for purposes of the Securities Act means a contract, transaction or
scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and
is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third
party . " 142 Apparently in deference to the principles enunciated
in Joiner, however, the Court admonished that "[t] he statutory policy
of affording broad protection to investors is not to be thwarted by un-
realistic and irrelevant formulae." 141
There are four basic elements to the Howey test: (1) the investment
of money; (2) in a common enterprise; (3) with the expectation of a
profit; (4) to come solely through the efforts of others. 4 4  Since
139. Id. at 351.
140. Id. at 352-53 (emphasis supplied).
141. 328 U.S. 293 (1946). The defendant company was an established Florida citrus
fruit growing firm which desired to increase its production. The company was able
to secure an additional 500 acres of suitable land, but it had to sell half of the land
in small plots to investors in order to raise development capital. Since purchasers of
the land were not in a position to develop and care for their plots, they also were
offered management contracts with an affiliated corporation, Howey-in-the-Hills Service.
Inc.
142. Id. at 298-99.
143. Id. at 301.
144. In announcing this definition, the Court claimed that it was not formulating a
new test but merely adopting that employed by state courts prior to the Securities
Act of 1933. The Court's theory was that Congress, in including the term in the
definition of a security in the Securities Act, was aware of and intended to adopt the
existing definition. An examination of state cases decided prior to 1933, however, reveals
that the "common enterprise" and "solely through the efforts of others" portions of the
definition have no basis in pre-1933 case law. For a discussion and detailed analvsis of.
these state cases, together with the early federal cases, see Long, An Attempt to Retw'n
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Howey, the state courts, although not compelled to do so,145 generally
have applied this four-part test in securities cases to determine whether
a particular instrument is an investment contract. When a standard
such as the Howey test is repeated over a period of time, it often becomes
a rubric, the courts tending to lose sight of its original meaning and pur-
pose. As a result, the test becomes wooden and artificial and its appli-
cation mechanical. Obviously, the unthinking repetition of the test
may be justified when a particular instrument is clearly an investment
contract.14 Nevertheless, as recognized by the Supreme Court in Joiner,
there is a danger that unusual financial arrangements, such as referral
sales, founder-membership plans, and pyramid sales schemes,14 7 will
escape regulation if courts insist upon applying inflexible standards.
Initially, it appeared that promoters could avoid the requirements of
the securities acts by devising schemes which did not fall within the
precise language of the Howey definition. 148 As new investment schemes
"Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of Securities Regulation, 24 OxrA. L. REv.
135 (1971).
145. Since the Howey decision involved an interpretation of a federal statute rather
than the Constitution, state courts may regard the case as persuasive, but not binding,
authority. State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971). See
Department of Indus. Relations v. Drummon, 30 Ala. App. 76, 1 So. 2d 395, cert.
denied, 241 Ala. 142, 1 So. 2d 402 (1941).
146. A basic problem with the Howey test is that it was formulated in a case
where the investor was completely passive, since Howey-in-the-Hills Service, Inc.
furnished both the management and physical labor necessary to raise the citrus fruit.
It thus was unnecessary for the Court to specify the type and degree of investor par-
ticipation necessary for a scheme to escape classification as an investment contract.
The same has been true with respect to most of the decisions applying the test. See, e.g.,
Tcherepnin v. K~night, 389 U.S. 332 (1967); Ahrens v. American-Canadian Beaver Co.,
428 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1970); Roe v. United States, 287 F.2d 435 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 824 (1961). Courts, however, recently have become more critical in their
analyses as a result of the blatant attempts of promoters, in requiring investors to
perform some minor function in the enterprise, to remove their operations from the
scope of the Howey test.
147. These schemes appear to be as old as securities regulation. See, e.g., State v.
Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 177 N.W. 937 (1920), involving a "booster"
contract. In the mid-1920's, the Indiana Attorney General was called upon to consider
several schemes strikingly similar to those used recently by Glenn Turner. See
1925-26 Op. Art', GEr. (Ind.) 154 (1925); id. at 254 (1926).
148. In Commonwealth ex rel. Pennsylvania Sec. Comm'n v. Consumers Research Con-
sultants, Inc., 414 Pa. 253, 199 A.2d 428 (1964), and in Emery v. So-Soft, Inc, 30 Ohio
Op. 2d 226, 199 N.E.2d 120 (Ct. App. 1964), classification of referral selling schemes as
securities was denied on the basis that the Howey test requires the company paying the
return to make a profit; under the referral schemes in question the fee was paid without
regard to whether the paying company made a profit. This approach was soundly rejected
in State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971); a careful
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proliferated and investors' complaints of sharp practices increased,' l
however, many courts saw the need to develop new and more flexible
tests for determining whether particular instruments are investment
contracts. For example, in refusing a mechanical application of the
Howey test, the court in State ex rel. Park v. Glenn Turner Enter-
prises, Inc.15° stated: "As a matter of fact, such a test provides a built-in
loophole for any . . . person to devise methods to avoid the purpose
of the Securities Law. The Howey test constitutes an invitation to de-
fraud the public and accordingly could not be expected to stand as an
exclusive test." The change in judicial attitude also is reflected in the
fact that since mid-1970 only one case dealing with founder-membership
plans or pyramid sales schemes has applied the Howey test without
questioning its continued validity.'
Although some of the courts which have reevaluated the Howey
test have completely rejected it in favor of what they deemed more ap-
propriate standards, others have modified that portion of the test re-
reading of Hocwey indicates that the reference to "profit" is to the investor's profit, not
that of the paying enterprise. Similarly, in a series of. four cases, Alabama, Georgia, and
Texas courts mechanically applied the solely through the efforts of others portion of
the test to exclude instruments where the investor's participation was minor, had
nothing to do with the management of the enterprise, and did not affect the success
or failure of his investment. Gallion v. Alabama Mkt. Centers, Inc., 282 Ala. 679, 213
So. 2d 841 (1968); Georgia Mkt. Centers, Inc. v. Fortson, 225 Ga. 854, 171 S.E.2d 620
(1969); Bruner v. State, 463 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970); Koscot Interplanetary,
Inc. v. King, 452 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). See also SEC v. Koscot Inter-
planetary, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 588 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
149. SEC Commissioner Hugh Owens recently estimated that the loss to investors
in pyramid sales schemes alone has amounted to more than $1 billion. Address of SEC
Commissioner Hugh F. Owens to the North American Securities Administrators Asso-
ciation, San Antonio, Texas, SEc. REG. & L. REP. No. 222, at G-I (Oct. 10, 1973).
150. 3 BLuE SKY L. REP. V 71,023, at 67,201 (Idaho Dist. Ct., Ada County, Mar.
29, 1972).
151. See SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 588 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
It is clear that this court did not wish to apply the Ho'wey test strictly
and that it did so only because it felt it had no alternative. It is interesting to note
that most of the cases which have applied the test without modification are federal
decisions involving franchise agreements. See, e.g., Nash & Associates, Inc. v. Lum's of
Ohio, Inc, 484 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1973); Cobb v. Network Cinema Corp., 339 F. Supp.
95 (N.D. Ga. 1972). Recently two federal courts have shown a willingness to recognize
the similarity between franchise arrangements and pyramid sales schemes and hold that
in some situations franchises may be investment contracts. Lino v. City Investing Co.,
CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,124 (3d Cir. Aug. 20, 1973); Mitzner v. Cardet Int'l, Inc.,
358 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. IMI. 1973).
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quiring that profits be derived solely through the efforts of others. 15 2
Those courts opting for modification have either reexamined the solely
requirement or attempted to define what is meant by efforts of others.
For example, the trial court in State v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc.153
held that an investment contract exists as long as profits are generated
substantially through the efforts of others. Under such an interpreta-
tion the transaction would be subject to regulation under the securities
laws even though the investor participated to a limited extent in the
common enterprise.
This modification of the Howey test, although quickly adopted by
a Colorado court in D.M.C. v. Hays,5 4 initially was not accepted by
many jurisdictions. In SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Ine.,155
however, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied a similar
test in holding that the "Adventures" sold by the "Dare to Be Great"
portion of the Turner empire were investment contracts. Noting that
a rigid application of the Howey test would defeat the general purposes
of the securities laws, the court stated:
Strict interpretation of the requirement that profits to be earned
must come "solely" from the efforts of others has been subject to
criticism .... Adherence to such an interpretation could result
in a mechanical, unduly restrictive view of what is and what is not
an investment contract. It would be easy to evade by adding a
requirement that the buyer contribute a modicum of effort. Thus
the fact that the investors here were required to exert some efforts
if a return were to be achieved should not automatically preclude
a finding that the Plan or Adventure is an investment contract. To
do so would not serve the purpose of the legislation. Rather we
adopt a more realistic test, 'whether the efforts made by those
other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those
152. For general discussion of these decisions, see Note, Pyramid Schemes: Dare to
Be Regulated, 61 GEO. L.J. 1257 (1973); Note, Regulation of Pyramid Sales Ventures,
15 WM. & MARY L. REv. 117 (1973); 51 Tx. L. REv. 788 (1973).
153. [1961-1971 transfer binder] BLuE SKY L. RPP. 70,880 (Hawaii Cir. Ct., 1st Cir.,
Oct. 21, 1970), aff'd on other grounds, 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971).
154. 11961-1971 transfer binder) BLuE Sxy L. REP. 70,897 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Denver
County, Feb. 26, 1971). This approach may also be the basis for the earlier decision
in Florida Discount Centers, Inc. v. Antinori, 226 So. 2d 693 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969),
aff'd and opinion adopted, 232 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1970). See also In re Discount Mart
Corp., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 71,003 (Okla. Sec. Comm'n Oct. 28, 1970).
155. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 117 (1973), aff'g 348 F. Supp.
766 (D. Ore. 1972). See also Hurst v. Dare to Be Great, Inc., 474 F.2d 483 (9th Cir.
1973).
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essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of
the enterprise.156
Since its promulgation in February 1973, this test has been approved
by a number of other federal courts. 157
In State v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc.,"8 the Supreme Court of
Hawaii affirmed the trial court's decision that the founder-member
agreements sold by the defendant were securities under the Hawaii
Uniform Securities Act. However, it specifically rejected any test em-
phasizing the quantity rather than the quality of investor participation
in the enterprise:
Finally, as previously stated, it is irrelevant to the remedial pur-
poses of the Securities Act that an investor participates in a minor
way in the operations of the enterprise. Courts should focus on
the quality of the participation. In order to negate the findings
of a security the offeree should have practical and actual control
over the managerial decisions of the enterprise. For it is this con-
trol which gives the offeree the opportunity to safeguard his own
investment, thus obviating the need for state intervention.' 9
Like the "substantial efforts" approach employed by the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit in Glenn Turner, this "managerial efforts"
test has met with wide acceptance. 60
156. 474 F.2d at 482 (emphasis supplied).
157. See, e.g., Lino v. City Investing Co., CCH FED. Stac. L. REP. 94,124 (3d Cir.
Aug. 20, 1973); Mitzner v. Cardet Int'l, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. IMI. 1973).
158. 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971).
159. Id. at- , 485 P.2d at 111.
160. See, e.g., Venture Inv. Co. v. Schaefer, 3 BLUE SKY L. RaP. 71,031 (D. Colo.
June 16, 1972), aff'd on other grounds, 478 F.2d 156 (10th Cir. 1973); SEC v. Glenn
Turner Entrp., Inc., 348 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ore. 1972), aff'd on other grounds, 474 F.2d
476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 117 (1973); State ex rel. Park v. Glenn Turner
Entrp., Inc, 3 BLUE SKY L. RE. 71,023 (Idaho Dist. Ct., Ada County, Mar. 29, 1972);
State ex rel. Fisher v. World Mkt. Center, Inc., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 71,034 (Okla.
Dist. qt., Okla. County, June 2, 1972), aff'd, 44 Okla. Bar J. 2218 (Okla. App. 1973).
Although both the "substantial efforts" and "managerial efforts" tests emphasize
managerial rather than physical efforts, the standard formulated in Hawaii Alarket
Center would eliminate a particular investment from securities coverage if the in-
vestor has any actual management control. On the other hand, the "substantial efforts"
test adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Glenn Turner would eliminate coverage only
if the investor plays a significant role in the management of the enterprise. Although
the result will be the same in many cases, application of the "substantial efforts" test
could lead to some .anomalous results. For example, assume that a general accounting
partnership has 100 general partners, not an uncommon situation in this age of na-
tional accounting firms. Since a general partnership interest carries with it a right
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Although one jurisdiction appears to have completely rejected the
Howey test,'' others have held that it is only one of several tests
which can be applied to determine whether a particular instrument is an
investment contract.16 2 For example, in Silver Hills Country Club v.
Sobieski,'63 the defendants solicited capital to construct the facilities
for a newly formed country club. In return for his money, the investor
received only the right to use the facilities, since the legal title to the
country club and all rights to profits from operation of its facilities
remained with the defendants. Applying what subsequently has been
termed a "risk capital test," the California Supreme Court held that the
subscription agreements were investment contracts. Justice Traynor,
writing for the majority, observed: "We have here nothing like the
ordinary sale of a right to use existing facilities. Petitioners are soliciting
the risk capital with which to develop a business for profit. The pur-
chaser's risk is not lessened merely because the interest he purchases is
to participate in the management of the partnership, such an interest would not be a
security under the "managerial efforts" test adopted in Hawaii Market Center so long
-as the partner had not formally or informally contracted away his right to participate.
This would be true whether there were two or 10,000 partners. On the other hand,
under the "substantial efforts" test as applied in Glenn Turner, the interest in the
general accounting firm probably would be a security, since the management interest
is insignificant, that is, one vote in a hundred. If, however, the firm had only five
partners, the same interest would not be a security because each partner would assume
a more significant role in the firm's management. Thus, it appears that the "substantial
efforts" test makes the size and quality of the management interest, not the mere
existence of a management right, the hallmark of securities classification. In this light,
the "managerial efforts" test of the Hawaii court may be preferable to avoid anomalous
classifications.
161. In Florida Discount Centers, Inc. v. Antinori, 226 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1969), aff'd and opinion adopted, 232 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1970), the court stated: "We
read Chapter 517 [the Florida Blue Sky Law] without once encountering any suggestion
that the efforts productive of profit must be limited to others than the investors." The
present state of the law in Florida is unclear. Subsequent decisions considering
the question, Frye v. Taylor, 263 So. 2d 835 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972), Bond v.
Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 246 So. 2d 631 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971), second appeal,
263 So. 2d 835 (Fla. Dist. Cr. App. 1973), although apparently following Florida Discount
and rejecting Howey, have failed clearly to indicate what test is being applied.
162. State v. Investors Security Corp., - Minn. -, 209 N.W.2d 405 (1973); State
ex rel. Healy v. Consumer Business Sys., Inc., 92 Ore. 287, 482 P.2d 549 (Ct. App. 1971);
State ex rel. Park v. Glenn Turner Entrp., Inc., 3 BLuE, Sxy L. RFP. 71,023 (Idaho
Dist. Ct., Ada County, Mar. 29, 1972); Shapiro v. First Federated Commodity Trust Co.,
3 Br.uE SKY L. REP. 71,071 (Md. Cir. Ct., Baltimore County, May 30, 1973).
163. 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961). Silver Hills is not the
first case to apply a risk capital concept. See Brownie Oil Co. v. Railroad Comm'n,
207 lVis. 88, 240 N.W. 827 (1932); 27 Op. ATr'y GEN. (Wis.) 598 (1938); 26 id. 370
(1937).
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labelled a membership. Only because he risks his capital along with
other purchasers can there be any chance that the benefits of the club
membership will materialize." 164
The risk capital test applies to all situations in which the investor
contributes to the capital necessary to finance an enterprise and receives
in return the right to some benefit. Under the Silver Hills decision it
is not necessary that the investor receive an equity interest' or a right
to profits. 6 Moreover, a recent case apparently has extended the Silver
Hills rule in holding that an agreement to contribute capital to an
existing enterprise was an investment contract. 67
The "managerial efforts" standard set forth by the Supreme Court
of Hawaii in State v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc. 68 actually was only
part of a comprehensive new definition of investment contracts formu-
164. 55 Cal. 2d at 814, 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188. Unfortunately, the opinion
was not clear as to the effect of the risk capital test on existing California securities
law. Did the court intend to create an exclusive test or an alternative to the Howey
test, or did it intend merely to add an additional element to the Howey analysis?
All three interpretations have been given the Silver Hills opinion. Because the California
court earlier had adopted the Howey standards in People v. Syde, 37 Cal. 2d 765, 235
P.2d 601 (1951), and since both Howey and Syde were cited in Silver Hills with ap-
parent approval, it would not seem that the Silver Hills case replaced the Howey test
completely. The California Corporation Commission has treated the Silver Hills case
as establishing an alternative test and appears to use the Silver Hills and Howey-Syde
tests interchangeably. Compare 5 CAL. Coap. COMM'R OwIcIiAL Op. 73/42C (Mar.
20, 1973) with 5 CAL. CORP. COMM'R OFFIcIAL Op. 73/81C (May 31, 1973). This view
was expressed by the Oregon court in State ex tel. Healy v. Consumer Business Sys., Inc.,
92 Ore. 287, 482 P.2d 549 (Ct. App. 1971). On the other hand, it could be argued that
the Silver Hills court was attempting to isolate and identify an element of an invest-
ment contract not accounted for in the Howey definition. This was the approach
adopted by the court in State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d
105 (1971).
165. Capital in the broad economic sense should be distinguished from capital in
the narrow balance sheet sense. A person who lends an enterprise money and
receives a bond or promissory note in return contributes to the economic capital of
the enterprise but has no interest in its equity. The same may be true in the invest-
ment contract situation. But see International Commodity Trust, Inc. v. Fisher, 3
BLuF SKY L. REP. 71,075 (Okla. Dist. Ct, Okla. County, May 14, 1973), where the
court failed to make this distinction with respect to commodity options.
166. This is made clear in the following statement by the Silver Hills court: "Since
the act does not make profit to the supplier of capital the test of what is a security,
it seems all the more clear that its objective is to afford those who risk their capital
at least a fair chance of realizing their objectives in legitimate ventures whether or
not they expect a return on their capital in one form or another." 55 Cal. 2d at 816-17,
361 P.2d at 908-09, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89.
167. State ex tel. Park v. Glenn Turner Entrp. Inc., 3 BLUE Say L. REP. f 71,023 (Idaho
Dist. Ct., Ada County, Mar. 29, 1972).
168. 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971).
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lated by the court, which, influenced by Professor Coffey's argument
that courts should recognize the economic realities of securities transac-
tions,"6 9 attempted to combine the best features of the Howey test with
the risk capital formula:
[W]e hold that for the purposes of the Hawaii Uniform Securi-
ties Act (Modified) an investment contract is created whenever:
(1) An offeree furnishes initial value to an offeror, and
(2) a portion of this initial value is subjected to the risks of the
enterprise, and
(3) the furnishing of the initial value is induced by the offeror's
promises or representations which give rise to a reasonable under-
standing that a valuable benefit of some kind, over and above the
initial value, will accrue to the offeree as a result of the operation
of the enterprise, and
(4) the offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical and
actual control over the managerial decisions of the enterprise. 170
As the foregoing discussion suggests, the courts have not agreed upon
one definition of investment contracts. It is submitted, however, that
application of any of the four major tests which have been developed,
either as modifications of the Howey definition or as alternatives thereto,
results in the conclusion that naked commodity options are investment
contracts.
The risk capital theory in its purest form requires nothing more than
the investment of money in an enterprise which may or may not yield
some benefit to the investor. Applying this test to the "naked" com-
modity option, it should be clear that there is an investment of money
in the form of the option premium or fee. In addition, there is the
obvious expectation of a benefit in the form of the payment of money
when the option dealer repurchases a profitable option. The only re-
maining question is whether this money is invested in the risk or eco-
169. Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaningful
Formula?, 18 V. Rr-s. L. REv. 367 (1967).
170. 52 Hawaii at -, 485 P.2d at 109 (footnotes omitted). This test has been
accepted by a number of courts. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Entrp., Inc., 348 F. Supp.
766 (D. Ore. 1972), aff'd on other grounds, 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 94
S. Ct. 117 (1973); Venture Inv. Co. v. Schaefer, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 71,031 (D.
Colo. 1972), affd on other grounds, 478 F.2d 156 (10th Cir. 1973); State ex rel.
Park v. Glenn Turner Entrp., Inc., 3 BLuaE SKY L. REP. 71,023 (Idaho Dist. Ct., Ada
County, Mar. 29, 1972); State ex rel. Fisher v. World Mkt. Centers, Inc., 3 BLUE SKY L.
RF'. 71,034 (Okla. Dist. Cc., Okla. County, June 2, 1972), aff'd, 44 Okla. Bar J. 2218
(Cr. App. June 26, 1973).
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nomic capital used to generate the monetary benefit expected by the
option purchaser. As previously indicated, the vast majority of option
dealers are woefully undercapitalized.' 7' It is manifest that in order
to honor their repurchase commitments, these dealers must either invest
the money they take in as premiums or use the money received from
the sale of new options to repurchase older options as they are exer-
cised.172 In the latter case, the firm will go bankrupt if it suffers an
adverse cash flow.
Applying the Hawaii Market Center test, the transaction clearly en-
tails the transfer of initial capital from the purchaser of the naked option
to the dealer. This investment is induced by the promise that if certain
events occur, a benefit will accrue to the option holder, that is, on the
agreed-upon date, the dealer will pay the holder the difference between
the striking price of the option and the current market value of the
underlying commodity futures. Furthermore, because the dealer must
invest the capital within its control to generate the funds required to
satisfy its repurchase obligations, 73 the option holder's investment is
171. Goldstein Samuelson was formed on April 28, 1971, with about $800 of capital.
Stipulation, supra note 6, at 3. During its entire life, the capital of Goldstein Samuel-
son consisted of this initial $800, the premiums received from the sale of the options,
profits from its own commodity futures speculation, interest on certain business loans,
and returns from investments in other business enterprises. ld. at 19. Therefore, the
$800 original capital was used to finance a business which sold 175,000 naked options
for $88 million. Id. at 7. Not bad leverage!
172. A number of second generation option dealers claim that option premiums will
be held in an escrow account until their repurchase obligations are satisfied. The
California Corporation Commissioner has held that funds placed in an escrow account
until after the completion of a construction contract may be classified as risk capital.
5 CAL. CoRP. COMM'R OFFICIAL Op. 73/18C (Feb. 2, 1973); 5 CAL. CORP. COzMszta'R
OFFICIAL Op. 73/49C (Mar. 21, 1973). The same rationale should apply when option
premiums are placed in an escrow account if the dealer uses interim financing to
meet his repurchase obligations. In such a situation, the option holder, although assured
that he will recoup his original investment, still must assume the risk that his option
will not yield a profit. Such an arrangement thus would not appear "to afford those
who risk their capital at least a fair chance of realizing their objectives," which is
the stated purpose of the risk capital test. Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55
Cal. 2d 811, 816-17, 361 P.2d 906, 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186, 188 (1961).
173. In discussing the risk assumed by the investors in the founder-membership
scheme in Hawaii Market Center, the Supreme Court of Hawaii stated: "[A] very
large percentage of founder-members will be totally dependent on sales commissions
to recover their initial investment plus income. It is thus apparent that the security
of the founder-members' investment is inseparable from the risks of the enterprise.
The success of the plan is the common 'thread on which everybody's beads fare]
strune."' 52 Hawaii at -, 485 P.2d at 110, citing SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,
320 U.S. 344, 348 (1943). It therefore appears the Hawaii Market Center court would
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subject to the risks of the enterprise. Finally, the investor clearly has
no practical or actual control over the investment policies of the option
dealer.
In the context of the two recent variations of the Howey test, it is
clear that the purchaser of a naked commodity option contract con-
tributes capital to a common enterprise and expects to receive a re-
turn on his investment. It is submitted that a court's view of the
degree of investor participation necessary for an instrument to escape
inclusion within the Howey test should not affect the ultimate con-
clusion that naked options are investment contracts. The important
factor is whether such participation is directed toward the generation
of the expected return, not merely the determination of the amount of
that return. It is evident that the naked option dealer makes all the in-
vestment decisions concerning the generation of funds necessary to meet
his contractual repurchase obligations. As Mr. Goldstein carefully
has pointed out, once the naked option contract is executed, the investor
has no right to participate in decisions involving the investment of his
money.174 It is the hallmark of the securities laws that protection be
afforded passive investors against the risk that those with whom they
deal will be unable to perform their contractual obligations. 175 In this
context, purchasers of naked options clearly qualify for protection.
require that the risk capital be invested in the common enterprise. For a consideration
of the problems that some courts have had in finding a common enterprise in the case
of commodity options, see notes 176-92 infra & accompanying text.
174. Testimony, supra note 33, at 59. See also Stipulation, supra note 6, at 9.
175. Recently, this concept was expressed very well by the Georgia Securities Com-
missioner:
When an investor buys or sells a commodities future contract or option,
he assumes two risks. First he assumes the obvious risk that the market
trend may be unfavorable to his investment position.... This risk is in-
herent in any investment, and does not, of itself, make a commodities
transaction a security. There is, however, a second risk which the investor
assumes when he deals in commodities futures and options. He assumes the
risk that the person on the other side of the contract . . . will be unable or
unwilling to perform his part of. the contract when called on to do so.
This is known as the "enterprise risk."
If the seller (with respect to a long contract), buyer (with respect to a
short contract), or writer (with respect to an option contract) actually
owns the commodity or contract to which the sale relates, the enterprise
risk is no more than it is in any contractual relationship, and no security
is present....
The enterprise risk becomes critical, however, in the case where the seller,
buyer, or writer is not fully "covered." In such a case, his ability to per-
form his contractual obligation to the investor is solely dependent on the
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Unfortunately, two of the four courts which have considered the issue
have held that naked option contracts are not investment contracts on
the ground that such agreements do not involve a common enter-
prise. 176 It is significant that this portion of the Howey definition is not
even mentioned in any of the state court decisions from which that
standard supposedly was derived. 177 Consequently, the validity of this
requirement lately has been questioned,'178 even in one case involving
commodity options.179
Several recent decisions, however, not only have applied the require-
ment but also have deviated from the original concept of a common
enterprise. In Ailnarik v. M-S Commodities, lnc.,50 for instance, the
issue was whether a discretionary commodities futures trading account
is an investment contract.' 8 ' Holding that such accounts are not securi-
ties because they do not involve a common enterprise, the court stated
that under the Howey formulation a common enterprise requires a
"pooling of capital," that is, a number of investors must turn their
skill and ability with which he invests the money and hedges the contracts
of his numerous investors whose funds he has received. Here we have a
classic example of a case in which "the scheme involves an investment of
money with profits to come solely from the efforts of. others." In such a
case, the sale of commodities contracts or options is a security and subject
to the provisions of the Georgia Securities Law.
Commodities Trading, supra note 23, at 10,504.
176. SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., Civ. A. No. CA 3-6976-D (N.D. Tex.
Apr. 9, 1973); International Commodity Trust, Inc. v. Fisher, 3 BLuE SKY L. REP.
71,075 (Okla. Dist. Ct., Okla. County, May 14, 1973).
177. See note 144 supra.
178. The California Corporation Commission has held that the existence of a com-
mon enterprise is not an essential element of an investment contract under California
law. 5 CAL. CoRp. COMM'R OFFICIAL Op. 73/42C (Mar. 20, 1973). A similar position
was taken in State v. Investors Security Corp., - Minn. -, 209 N.W.2d 405 (1973),
in which the court stated: "The existence of a 'common enterprise' has never been
the acid test to determine whether an investment contract is present. 'Common enter-
prise' can be no more than an aid to reasoning rather than a strict mechanical test."
209 N.W.2d at 411.
179. Shapiro v. First Federated Commodity Trust Co., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 71,071
(Md. Cir. Ct., Baltimore County, May 30, 1973).
180. 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
181. Earlier cases had held that such accounts are securities. See, e.g., Bache & Co.
v. Commercial Iron & Metal Co., CCH FED. SEc. L. RFP. 93,114 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
Berman v. Orimex Trading, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Maheu v. Reynolds
& Co., 282 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Subsequently, this position was reaffirmed in
Commercial Iron & Metal Co. v. Bache & Co., 478 F2d 39 (10th Cir. 1973) and John-
son v. Arthur Espey, Shearson, Hammill & Co., 341 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
See also Anderson v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 291 F. Supp. 705 (D. Minn. 1968).
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money over to a promoter in exchange for a share in a common invest-
ment fund. In MilNarik, it was held that there was no common enter-
prise because the defendant brokerage house treated each discretionary
account separately and not as a part of a common fund. A similar re-
sult was reached in Wasnowic v. Chicago Board of Trade.18 2
This "pooling of capital" concept was applied to naked commodity
option contracts in SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp.8 3 and In-
ternational Commodity Trust, Inc. v. Fisher8 4 both courts holding that
a common enterprise was not established because the defendants main-
tained separate trading accounts for each option purchaser. It is sub-
mitted that these decisions have misapplied the Howey concept of a
common enterprise, which requires only that the investor associate with
another person or persons in an enterprise created for the purpose of
making a profit."5 In addition, they indicate a fundamental lack of ap-
preciation of the economic realities of the naked option market as it
presently is constituted. As stated earlier,8 6 it is probably correct for
a court to hold that agreements to buy or sell commodity futures are
not securities on the ground that such transactions do not involve a com-
mon enterprise. 8 7 The investor in the futures market generally makes
unilateral decisions with respect to the selection of the futures con-
tracts he will purchase and the timing of his transactions. On the sur-
face, the same reasoning would seem to apply to naked commodity op-
182. 352 F. Supp. 1066 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
183. Civ. A. No. CA 3-6976-D (N.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 1973).
184. 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 71,075 (Okla. Dist. Ct., Okla. County, May 14, 1973).
185. Thus, a common enterprise should be found to exist whenever two or more in-
vestors furnish the capital used in an enterprise. See Anderson v. Francis I. duPont
& Co., 291 F. Supp. 705 (D. Minn. 1968); SEC v. Wickham, 12 F. Supp. 245 (D. Minn.
1935). Similarly, there is a common enterprise when a single person furnishes the
capital and two or more people are involved in using that capital to generate profits.
In its simplest form, a common enterprise exists where two persons, one with
capital and the other with an idea or special skills, combine their resources in order
to produce a monetary return. This is exactly the situation with respect to the dis-
cretionary commodity futures accounts considered in the Milnarik case. Since the
common enterprise requirement is really an economic concept, the legal relationship
between the parties to the enterprise should be irrelevant. Therefore, contrary to the
Milnarik holding and a decision of the California Corporation Commissioner, 4 CAL.
Corn. COAUI'R OFFIcIAL Op. 72/137C (Oct. 12, 1972) (involving the management of trot-
ting horses), a common enterprise may exist even though the parties assume a rela-
tionship of principal and agent.
186. See notes 82-85 supra & accompanying text.
187. This appears to be the view of the federal courts. See Wiggin v. Kohlmeyer
& Co., 446 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1971); Berman v. Dean Witter & Co., 353 F. Supp. 669
(C.D. Cal. 1973); Schwartz v. Bache & Co., 340 F. Supp. 995 (SD. Iowa 1972).
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don contracts. It is clear, however, that in practice the option holder
can realize a profit only if his dealer invests in the commodities market
or is successful in selling a large number of options. Because the option
dealer must use the funds obtained from many investors in order to
satisfy his repurchase obligations, the transaction involves the pooling
of capital and should be classified as a common enterprise, even under
the Milnarik application of that concept.
Implicit in the decisions in Continental Commodities and International
Commodity Trust is a refusal to examine the substance of the naked
option transaction and a naive acceptance of its legal form.'88 To do so
is to disregard the admonition of the Supreme Court in Howey that
investor protection "is not to be thwarted by unrealistic and irrelevant
formulae." 19
The better reasoned opinions have examined the mechanics of the naked
commodity option transaction and have held that under the Hozvey
test such options are securities. For example, in People v. Puts and Calls,
InC.,9 ° the court had little difficulty in finding that the options sold by
the defendant were investment contracts in which purchasers could ex-
pect to receive a profit substantially through the efforts of others. In
disposing of the common enterprise requirement, the court stated:
As to the common enterprise the Los Angeles Trust Deed
case' 9 ... defined such an enterprise as one in which the fortunes
of the investor are interwoven with and dependent upon the ef-
forts and success of those seeking the investment, or of third
parties.
It was highly significant to me that stipulated here-that the
return on the money put in by the customers of Puts and Calls,
188. Even if a court is unwilling to go behind the legal form of the naked com-
modity option, it could be argued that an investment contract exists in those cases
where the dealer or his representative selects the commodity options to be purchased
and either decides when to sell the options or automatically repurchases them at the end
of the option period. As previously noted, this is a common practice among the
naked option dealers. See note 45 supra & accompanying text. Moreover, such a
discretionary account may exist as the result of a tacit agreement between the parties.
See Johnson v. Arthur Espey, Shearson, Hammill & Co., 341 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y.
1972); Berman v. Orimex Trading, Inc, 291 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). This
analysis, however, would require the court to reject the Milnarik concept of a common
enterprise, since there is no pooling of funds and each account is treated separately.
189. 328 U.S. at 301.
190. 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 71,090 (Cal. Super. Ct, LA. County, June 21, 1973).
191. Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961) [editor's note].
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Inc. could come only from the resources of that organization,
that the resources of that organization were limited to the invest-
ment success that the company itself had, and the premium income
coming from other companies, plus the very minor amount of
capital and the hope that a few loans that were made would be
repaid.
I combine that with the fact that there was no rebuttal offered
of the deposition testimony of the witness Gish concerning the
defendant's displeasure when Mr. Gish attempted to have his cus-
tomers exercise and cash in their options, as showing rather vividly
that the customers' fortunes were in Puts and Calls' boat and Puts
and Calls was doing the rowing-or lack of rowing. I think that
shows a common enterprise.192
In conclusion, it is submitted that the naked commodity option con-
tract comes within any of the recent definitions of an investment con-
tract. This result can be reached easily if courts employ the type of
fair, accurate, and realistic analysis applied in Puts and Calls to a trans-
action which clearly should be regulated under the securities laws. 193
Instruments Commonly Known as Securities
Finally, a strong argument can be made that the naked commodity
option is an "instrument commonly known as a 'security'" and thus a
security within the standard definition. Like evidences of indebtedness,
this definitional category until recently had not received extensive treat-
ment by the courts, agencies, or legal scholars. In addition, before the
decision of the trial court in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises,
Inc., 9 4 it had never been used as an independent basis for subjecting an
investment scheme to regulation under the securities laws. 195 Subsequent
192. 3 BLuE SKY L. Rrp. 71,090, at 67,386.
193. Two other cases have concluded that naked options are investment contracts.
In re Traders Int'l, Ltd., Bankruptcy No. 7350 (D. Nev. Aug. 23, 1973) (decision of
the referee); In re Goldstein Samuelson, Inc., 3 BLUE SKY L. RaP. 71,095 (Okla. See.
Comm'n Feb. 23, 1973). The SEC has taken the same position. See Pretrial Memo-
randum of Fact and Law, SEC v. Goldstein Samuelson, Inc, Civ. A. No. 73-472 (C.D.
Cal., filed April 2, 1973); Address of SEC Commissioner Hugh F. Owens to the North
American Securities Administrators Association, San Antonio, Texas, SEC. RaG. & L.
REP. No. 222, at G-1 (Oct. 10, 1973).
194. 348 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ore. 1972), aff'd on other grounds, 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 117 (1973).
195. See, e.g., SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp, 320 U.S. 344 (1943); Curtis v.
Johnson, 92 Ill. App. 141, 234 N.E.2d 566 (1968); First Natel Say. Foundation, Inc. v.
Samp, 274 Wis. 118, 80 N.,.2d 249 (1956).
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to that decision, the court in SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.9'
also indicated that the securities classification issue could be disposed
of by holding that a particular instrument is commonly known as a
security but stated that existing authority did not support such an ap-
proach with respect to the investment scheme under consideration. 1 7
The district court in Glenn Turner, after stating that the defendant's
pyramid sales scheme could be classified as a security under this defini-
tional category, attempted to formulate a test which could be used to
determine what interests are commonly known as securities. Although
the opinion is unclear on this point,' it appears that the court utilized
the Silver Hills risk capital test. As noted in the previous section, it is
manifest that naked commodity options satisfy the risk capital test,
since they involve the investment of money in an enterprise which may
or may not yield some benefit to the investor. Therefore, employing the
Glenn Turner rationale, naked options are instruments commonly
known as securities. In reaching this conclusion, the court in Shapiro
v. First Federated Commodity Trust Co."99 stated: "[The naked com-
modity options] sold by First Federated [were] . . . within the defini-
tion of 'security' in the Maryland Securities Act, whether [they were]
investment contract[s] or [fall] within the catchall phrase 'in general,
any interest or instrument commonly known as a security.'"
CONCLUSION
Whether naked commodity option contracts should be classified as
securities cannot be resolved properly without a complete understanding
196. CCH FED. SEC. L. RP. 93,960 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
197. The Koscot decision raises the question of what standard should be used to
determine whether a particular instrument is commonly known as a security. The
district court in Glenn Turner indicated that an instrument would be classified as a
security if it is commonly treated as such by the law. 348 F. Supp. at 773. This also
seems to be the view of the court in Shapiro v. First Federated Commodity Trust Co.,
3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 71,071 (Md. Cir. Ct., Baltimore County, May 30, 1973). On
the other hand, the Koscot court indicated that the test should be whether the instru-
ment is commonly known as a security in financial, rather than legal, circles. The
legal standard would appear preferable.
198. The court cited not only "pure risk capital test" cases, such as State ex rel.
Healy v. Consumer Business Sys., Inc., 92 Ore. 287, 482 P.2d 549 (Ct. App. 1971), and
Hurst v. Dare to Be Great, Inc., 3 BLuE SKY L. REP. 71,012 (D. Ore. Dec. 23, 1971),
aff'd, 474 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1973), but also cases which are properly classified as
"combined risk capital and Hawey test" cases, such as State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc.,
52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971), and State ex rel. Park v. Glenn Turner Entrp,
Inc, 3 BLuE Sicy L. REP. 71,023 (Idaho Dist. Ct., Ada County, 1972).
199. 3 BLE SKY L. REP. 71,071, at 67,336 (Md. Cir. Ct., Baltimore County, May
30, 1973).
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of the manner in which such options are traded. The remedial purposes
of the securities laws can be achieved only if courts construe the securi-
ties acts liberally and examine the economic realities of particular trans-
actions. It is submitted that naked options can no longer be viewed
as rights to buy or sell "underlying" futures contracts. Instead, the
courts must recognize that the only promise made by the option dealer
is to repurchase the option if the price of particular commodity futures
contracts deviates from the option striking price. Since naked option
dealers typically are thinly capitalized, the optionee must bear the risk
that the dealer, through investment decisions in which the optionee
takes no part, will be unable to generate sufficient funds to satisfy his
repurchase obligations. Viewed in this light under established case law,
naked options can be classified as securities on any one or more of the
grounds that they are evidences of indebtedness, investment contracts, or
instruments commonly known as securities.
Although the first generation of naked commodity option firms have
come and gone, it appears that new dealerships are being formed to take
their place. Thus, the problem of classifying naked options for securities
purposes is by no means moot. Because of the patent need to regulate
trading in these options, it is hoped this Article will assist the courts in
understanding this new investment concept and the reasons for treating
it as a security within existing state and federal regulatory frameworks.
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